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On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students stormed the U.S. The immediate cause of this action was President Jimmy Carter’s decision to allow Iran’s deposed Shah, a pro-Western autocrat who had been expelled from his country some months before, to come to the United States for cancer treatment. However, the hostage-taking was about more than the Shah’s medical care: it was a dramatic way for the student revolutionaries to declare a break with Iran’s past and an end to American interference in its affairs. It was also a way to raise the intra- and international profile of the revolution’s leader, the anti-American cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The students set their hostages free on January 21, 1981, 444 days after the crisis began and just hours after President Ronald Reagan delivered his inaugural address. Many historians believe that hostage crisis cost Jimmy Carter a second term as president.
The Iran Hostage Crisis: The Shah and the C.I.A.
The Iran hostage crisis had its origins in a series of events that took place nearly a half-century before it began. The source of tension between Iran and the U.S. stemmed from an increasingly intense conflict over oil. British and American corporations had controlled the bulk of Iran’s petroleum reserves almost since their discovery–a profitable arrangement that they had no desire to change. However, in 1951 Iran’s newly elected prime minister, a European-educated nationalist named Muhammad Mossadegh, announced a plan to nationalize the country’s oil industry. In response to these policies, the American C.I.A. and the British intelligence service devised a secret plan to overthrow Mossadegh and replace him with a leader who would be more receptive to Western interests.
Through this coup, code-named a, Mossadegh was deposed and a new government was installed in August 1953. The new leader was a member of Iran’s royal family named Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah’s government was secular, anti-communist and pro-Western. In exchange for tens of millions of dollars in foreign aid, he returned 80 percent of Iran’s oil reserves to the Americans and the British.
For the C.I.A. and oil interests, the 1953 coup was a success. In fact, it served as a model for other covert operations during the Cold War, such as the 1954 government takeover in Guatemala and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba in 1961. However, many Iranians bitterly resented what they saw as American intervention in their affairs. The Shah turned out to be a brutal, arbitrary dictator whose secret police (known as the SAVAK) tortured and murdered thousands of people. Meanwhile, the Iranian government spent billions of dollars on American-made weapons while the Iranian economy suffered.
What Was The Iran Hostage Crisis?
By the 1970s, many Iranians were fed up with the Shah’s government. In protest, they turned to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a radical cleric whose revolutionary Islamist movement seemed to promise a break from the past and a turn toward greater autonomy for the Iranian people. In July 1979, the revolutionaries forced the Shah to disband his government and flee to Egypt. The Ayatollah installed a militant Islamist government in its place.
The United States, fearful of stirring up hostilities in the Middle East, did not come to the defense of its old ally. (For one thing, President Carter, aware of the Shah’s terrible record in that department, was reluctant to defend him.) However, in October 1979 President Carter agreed to allow the exiled leader to enter the U.S. for treatment of an advanced malignant lymphoma. His decision was humanitarian, not political; nevertheless, as one American later noted, it was like throwing “a burning branch into a bucket of kerosene.” Anti-American sentiment in Iran exploded.
On November 4, 1979, just after the Shah arrived in New York, a group of pro-Ayatollah students smashed the gates and scaled the walls of the American embassy in Tehran. Once inside, they seized 66 hostages, mostly diplomats and embassy employees. After a short period of time, 13 of these hostages were released. (For the most part, these 13 were women, African-Americans and citizens of countries other than the U.S.–people who, Khomeini argued, were already subject to “the oppression of American society.”) Some time later, a 14th hostage developed health problems and was likewise sent home. By midsummer 1980, 52 hostages remained in the embassy compound.
Diplomatic maneuvers had no discernible effect on the Ayatollah’s anti-American stance; neither did economic sanctions such as the seizure of Iranian assets in the United States. Meanwhile, while the hostages were never seriously injured, they were subjected to a rich variety of demeaning and terrifying treatment. They were blindfolded and paraded in front of TV cameras and jeering crowds. They were not allowed to speak or read, and they were rarely permitted to change clothes. Throughout the crisis there was a frightening uncertainty about their fate: The hostages never knew whether they were going to be tortured, murdered or set free.
The Canadian Caper
On the same day that students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, six American diplomats evaded capture by hiding in the home of Canadian diplomat John Sheardown. Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark issues Canadian passports to the six escapees to they could be flown to freedom, an event that came to be known as the “Canadian Caper.” A 1981 movie, “Escape From Iran: The Canadian Caper,” fictionalized their daring rescue.
The Iran Hostage Crisis: Operation Eagle Claw
President Carter’s efforts to bring an end to the hostage crisis soon became one of his foremost priorities. In April 1980, frustrated with the slow pace of diplomacy (and over the objections of several of his advisers), Carter decided to launch a risky military rescue mission known as Operation Eagle Claw. The operation was supposed to send an elite rescue team into the embassy compound. However, a severe desert sandstorm on the day of the mission caused several helicopters to malfunction, including one that veered into a large transport plane during takeoff. Eight American servicemen were killed in the accident, and Operation Eagle Claw was aborted.
The Iran Hostage Crisis: The 1980 Election
The constant media coverage of the hostage crisis in the U.S. served as a demoralizing backdrop for the 1980 presidential race. President Carter’s inability to resolve the problem made him look like a weak and ineffectual leader. At the same time, his intense focus on bringing the hostages home kept him away from the campaign trail.
The Republican candidate, former California governor Ronald Reagan, took advantage of Carter’s difficulties. Rumors even circulated that Reagan’s campaign staff negotiated with the Iranians to be sure that the hostages would not be released before the election, an event that would surely have given Carter a crucial boost. (Reagan himself always denied these allegations.) On Election Day, one year and two days after the hostage crisis began, Reagan defeated Carter in a landslide.
On January 21, 1981, just a few hours after Ronald Reagan delivered his inaugural address, the remaining hostages were released. They had been in captivity for 444 days.
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Iran-Contra Affair, 1980s U.S. political scandal in which the National Security Council (NSC) became involved in secret weapons transactions and other activities that either were prohibited by the U.S. Congress or violated the stated public policy of the government.
What was the Iran-Contra Affair?
The Iran-Contra Affair was a U.S. political scandal in which the National Security Council (NSC) became involved in secret weapons transactions and other activities that were either prohibited by the U.S. Congress or violated the stated public policy of the government.
Whom did the U.S. government support in Nicaragua?
The U.S. government provided military aid and financial support for the warring Nicaraguan opponents of the Sandinista regime, the contras, whom President Ronald Reagan referred to as “the moral equal” of the Founding Fathers of the United States.
Under whose presidency did the Iran-Contra affair take place?
The Iran-Contra Affair was a U.S. political scandal that took place during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
The Iran hostage crisis occurred when Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Iran and took a group of U.S. citizens hostage. They held the hostages for over a year from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981.
Iran Hostages Return Home
by Don Koralewski of the DoD
For many years, Iran had been ruled by a king called the Shah of Iran. The United States supported the Shah because he was against communism and sold oil to western nations. However, many people in Iran did not like the Shah. They thought he was a brutal dictator.
In the 1970s, revolutionaries led by the Muslim leader Ayatollah Khomeini began to protest against the government. In 1979, they managed to take control of the government and overthrew the Shah. The Shah fled Iran.
Jimmy Carter Admits the Shah
The Shah was sick with cancer at the time and needed medical care. President Jimmy Carter decided to allow the Shah to come to the United States to get treatment. This started off a wave of protests against the United States in Iran.
Takeover of the American Embassy
Angry at the United States for protecting the Shah, Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran on November 4, 1979. They took 66 of the people there hostage.
Thirteen of the hostages were let go after a short time. They were mostly women and African-Americans. A fourteenth man was released later when he got sick. The remaining 52 hostages were held for a total of 444 days.
Being a hostage was terrifying. For over a year, the hostages lived in fear of death and torture. They were sometimes blindfolded and marched in front of angry crowds. They often were not allowed to talk for months, placed in solitary confinement, and had their hands bound for days at a time. Their captors constantly threatened them with execution and even performed a mock execution one night to scare them.
In April of 1980, President Carter ordered a mission to rescue the hostages. It was called Operation Eagle Claw. The mission failed when a sandstorm damaged the helicopters, causing one helicopter to crash into a transport plane. Sadly, eight soldiers were killed in the crash.
The Hostages are Released
The Iranian militants holding the hostages agreed to start negotiations for their release in late 1980. The Shah had died of cancer and President Carter had lost his reelection bid for president to Ronald Reagan. As punishment to Carter, the militants waited until just after Reagan had taken the oath of office to release the hostages. After 444 days, on January 21, 1981, the hostages were sent home.
The seizure of the American embassy was initially planned in September 1979 by Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, a student at that time. He consulted with the heads of the Islamic associations of Tehran's main universities, including the University of Tehran, Sharif University of Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology (Polytechnic of Tehran) and Iran University of Science and Technology. Their group was named Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line.
Asgharzadeh later said there were five students at the first meeting, two of whom (including current Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—although this claim has been denied by the Iranian government—the Iranian opposition as well as a CIA investigation on the matter) wanted to target the Soviet embassy because the USSR was "a Marxist and anti-God regime". But two others, Mirdamadi and Habibolah Bitaraf, supported Asgharzadeh's chosen target—the United States. "Our aim was to object against the American government by going to their embassy and occupying it for several hours," Asgharzadeh said. "Announcing our objections from within the occupied compound would carry our message to the world in a much more firm and effective way." [ 28 ] Mirdamadi told an interviewer, "we intended to detain the diplomats for a few days, maybe one week, but no more." [ 29 ] Masoumeh Ebtekar, spokeswoman for the Iranian students during the crisis, said that those who rejected Asgharzadeh's plan did not participate in the subsequent events. [ 30 ]
The Islamist students observed the security procedures of the Marine Security Guards from nearby rooftops overlooking the embassy. They also used experiences from the recent revolution, during which the U.S. embassy grounds were briefly occupied. They enlisted the support of police in charge of guarding the embassy and of Islamic Revolutionary Guards. [ 31 ]
According to the group and other sources Khomeini did not know of the plan beforehand. [ 32 ] The Islamist students had wanted to inform him but according to author Mark Bowden, Ayatollah Musavi Khoeyniha persuaded them not to. Khoeyniha feared the government would use police to expel the Islamist students as they had the last occupiers in February. The provisional government had been appointed by Khomeini and so Khomeini was likely to go along with their request to restore order. On the other hand, Khoeyniha knew that if Khomeini first saw that the occupiers were his faithful supporters (unlike the leftists in the first occupation) and that large numbers of pious Muslims had gathered outside the embassy to show their support for the takeover, it would be "very hard, perhaps even impossible", for the Imam Khomeini to oppose the takeover, and this would paralyze the Bazargan administration Khoeyniha and the students wanted to eliminate. [ 33 ]
Though fear of an American-backed return by the Shah was the publicly stated reason, the true cause of the seizure was the long-standing U.S. support for the Shah's government. Reza Pahlavi ruled Iran from 1941 to 1979, with a brief period of exile in 1953 when he fled to Italy due to a power struggle with Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Because Mossadegh's policies and announcements created concern over access to Iranian oil, oil prices, and possible Soviet influence in Iran, the United States and British intelligence services aided Iranian military officers in a coup to overthrow the Prime Minister. After his return to power, the Shah established a very close alliance with the United States. The U.S. supplied weapons, training, and technical knowledge that aided the Shah in modernizing his country. However, the Shah ruled as a dictator, using SAVAK, his secret police, to terrorize his political enemies. The Shah was opposed by both the Marxist Tudeh Party, and by fundamentalist Islamic leaders who believed his policies and his reliance on the Americans were corrupting Iranian society.
By 1978, unrest against the Shah had escalated into a violent uprising against his authority called the Iranian Revolution or the Islamic Revolution. On January 16, 1979, the Shah fled into exile for a second time, traveling to various countries before finally entering the U.S. for cancer treatments in October, 1979. After the Shah's departure, the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini returned from his own exile in France to take power over Iran. Khomeini was a leading member of the Shia Muslim clergy. The Shia are a subset of the Islamic faith, and form the majority of the Iranian population. Vital parts of this Islamic Revolution were propaganda and demonstrations against the United States and against President Jimmy Carter. After the Shah's entry into the U.S., the Ayatollah Khomeini called for anti-American street demonstrations. On November 4, 1979, one such demonstration, organized by Iranian student unions loyal to Khomeini, took place outside the walled compound housing the U.S. Embassy.
Members of these Iranian student unions scaled the walls of the U.S. Embassy on November 4, 1979, taking 63 Americans hostage. Three more U.S. citizens were taken prisoner at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, for a total of 66 hostages. Within three weeks, the hostage-takers released several women and African-Americans, leaving 53. A sick hostage was later released, reducing the number to 52. Throughout their captivity, the hostages were paraded in front of television cameras, often blindfolded or hooded. Though the hostage-takers were not members of the Iranian government or military, their obvious, publicly-stated loyalty to Khomeini and the Islamic government created an international crisis.
Immediate official American reactions involved halting oil exports from Iran, expelling many Iranians living in the U.S., and freezing Iranian government assets and investments. Many Americans called for military action to free the hostages, but the situation became much more complicated when the Soviet Union invaded Iran's neighbor, Afghanistan, in order to crush an Islamic-based rebellion against that nation's Marxist government. President Carter now faced a crisis with oil-rich, but hostile Iran, a new Cold War crisis with the Soviets, and a growing sense in his own country that he was increasingly showing himself to be an ineffective leader.
Partly to counter the criticisms against him, as well as to free the hostages, President Carter ordered a military rescue mission code-named "Operation Eagle Claw." This mission was a total and complete failure resulting in the deaths of eight U.S. military personnel. On April 24, 1980, units of the rescue force landed in the Iranian desert to refuel their aircraft before heading to Tehran. A confusing series of events took place at this refueling point, including failed equipment, and desert sandstorms which reduced visibility. As a result of these problems, the rescue was called off. During the retreat, one of the helicopters collided with a transport airplane, causing an explosion which killed eight members of the rescue mission. Several of the burned American bodies were later part of grisly street demonstrations protesting the abortive U.S. "invasion" of Iran. A second rescue attempt was planned but never implemented, largely due to equipment failure.
Around 6:30 a.m. on November 4, the ringleaders gathered between 300 and 500 selected students, thereafter known as Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, and briefed them on the battle plan. A female student was given a pair of metal cutters to break the chains locking the embassy's gates, and she hid them beneath her chador. [ 34 ]
At first the students' plan to only make a symbolic occupation, release statements to the press and leave when government security forces came to restore order, was reflected in placards saying "Don't be afraid. We just want to set-in." When the embassy guards brandished firearms, the protesters retreated, one telling the Americans, "We don't mean any harm." [ 35 ] But as it became clear the guards would not use deadly force and that a large angry crowd had gathered outside the compound to cheer the occupiers and jeer the hostages, the occupation changed. [ 36 ] According to one embassy staff member, buses full of demonstrators began to appear outside the embassy shortly after the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line broke through the gates. [ 37 ]
As Ayatollah Musavi Khoeyniha had hoped, Khomeini supported the takeover. According to Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi, when he, Yazdi came to Qom to tell the Imam about the incident, Khomeini told the minister to "go and kick them out". But later that evening, back in Tehran, the minister heard on the radio that Imam Khomeini had issued a statement supporting the seizure and calling it "the second revolution", and the embassy an "American spy den in Tehran". [ 38 ]
The occupiers bound and blindfolded the embassy Marines and staff and paraded them in front of photographers. In the first couple of days many of the embassy staff who had snuck out of the compound or not been there at the time of the takeover were rounded up by Islamists and returned as hostages. [ 39 ] Six American diplomats did however avoid capture and found refuge at the nearby Canadian and Swiss embassies in Tehran for three months (Canadian caper). They fled Iran using Canadian passports on January 28, 1980. [ 40 ]
The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line demanded that the Shah return to Iran for trial and execution. The U.S. maintained that the Shah, who died less than a year later in July 1980, had come to America only for medical attention. The group's other demands included that the U.S. government apologize for its interference in the internal affairs of Iran, for the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq (in 1953), and that Iran's frozen assets in the U.S. be released.
The initial takeover plan was to hold the embassy for only a short time, but this changed after it became apparent how popular the takeover was and that Khomeini had given it his full support. [ 37 ] Some attribute the Iranian decision not to release the hostages quickly to U.S. President Jimmy Carter's "blinking" or failure to immediately deliver an ultimatum to Iran. [ 41 ] His immediate response was to appeal for the release of the hostages on humanitarian grounds and to share his hopes of a strategic anti-communist alliance with the Islamic Republic. [ 42 ] As some of the student leaders had hoped, Iran's moderate prime minister Mehdi Bazargan and his cabinet resigned under pressure just days after the event.
The duration of the hostages' captivity has been blamed on internal Iranian revolutionary politics. As Ayatollah Khomeini told Iran's president:
This action has many benefits. ". This has united our people. Our opponents do not dare act against us. We can put the constitution to the people's vote without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections." [ 43 ]
Theocratic Islamists, as well as leftist political groups and figures like leftist People's Mujahedin of Iran, [ 44 ] supported the taking of American hostages as an attack on "American imperialism" and its alleged Iranian "tools of the West". Revolutionary teams displayed secret documents purportedly taken from the embassy, sometimes painstakingly reconstructed after shredding, [ 45 ] to buttress their claim that "the Great Satan" (the U.S.) was trying to destabilize the new regime, and that Iranian moderates were in league with the U.S. The documents were published in a series of books called Documents from the US Espionage Den (Persian: اسناد لانه جاسوسی امریكا ). These books included telegrams, correspondence, and reports from the U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency.
By embracing the hostage-taking under the slogan "America can't do a thing," Khomeini rallied support and deflected criticism from his controversial Islamic theocratic constitution, [ 46 ] which was due for a referendum vote in less than one month. [ 47 ] Following the successful referendum, both leftists and theocrats continued to use the issue of alleged pro-Americanism to suppress their opponents, the relatively moderate political forces, which included the Iranian Freedom Movement, National Front, Grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, [ 48 ] and later President Abolhassan Banisadr. In particular, carefully selected diplomatic dispatches and reports discovered at the embassy and released by the hostage-takers led to the disempowerment and resignations of moderate figures [ 49 ] such as Premier Mehdi Bazargan. The political danger in Iran of any move seen as accommodating America, along with the failed rescue attempt, delayed a negotiated release. After the hostages were released, leftists and theocrats turned on each other, with the stronger theocratic group annihilating the left.
█ FURTHER READING:
Rivers, Gayle, and James Hudson. The Teheran Contract. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,1981.
Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran. New York: Random House, Inc., 1985.
Wells, Tim. Four Hundred and Forty-Four Days: The Hostages Remember. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985.
Schaumburg, Ron. "Americans Held Hostage." New York Times Upfront. (January 15, 2001):23.
Olson, Tod. "America Held Hostage: The Iranian Hostage Crisis Would Torment America — and Topple a President."Scholastic Update. (May 11, 1998):20 – 22.
HOSTAGE CRISIS, the events following the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran by leftist Islamist students in 1979 with subsequent wide-ranging repercussions on Iran&rsquos domestic politics as well as on U.S.-Iran relations. The crisis began on 4 November 1979, nine months after Moḥammad-Reżā Shah Pahalvi (r. 1941-79) had been overthrown and exiled and two weeks after he had been admitted to the U.S. for medical treatment, when some 300 leftist Islamist students stormed the embassy and took all personnel hostage. Mindful of the 1953 coup d&rsquoétat (q.v.) that reinstated the shah to power, the students vowed to keep the hostages until he was extradited to Persia from the United States and placed on trial for his &ldquoheinous crimes&rdquo against the country. The embassy takeover developed into a momentous crisis that lasted 444 long days it affected Iran&rsquos destiny for decades. The crisis ended on 10 January 1981, when the hostages were freed.
The events leading to the crisis. The hostage crisis took place in a sensitive period, when Iran was in revolutionary chaos and the direction of its revolution not clearly defined. Diametrically opposed groups were engaged in a ferocious power struggle. The hostage crisis intensified this power struggle. Ayatollah Khomeini and a number of leading pragmatic figures in the new regime, including ʿAli-Akbar Hā&scaronemi-Rafsanjāni and Sayyed Moḥammad Ḥosayni-Behe&scaronti as well as the leftist Islamist students who initiated the event, manipulated and prolonged the crisis in order to craft a new political landscape for Iran. They used the hostage crisis to defeat their liberal and secular leftist rivals to ratify a new constitution legitimizing the new regime to develop the institutions and infrastructure of the nascent republic and to terminate the Iranian alliance with the U.S. Two months into the crisis, a perceptive Muslim statesman informed the U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that &ldquoyou will not get your hostages until Khomeini has put all the institutions of the Islamic Revolution in practice&rdquo (Christopher, 1985, p. 44). No wonder Ayatollah Khomeini called the hostage crisis &ldquoIran&rsquos second revolution, more important than the first one&rdquo (Khomeini, 1983, p. 301).
Soon after the ancien regime collapsed, &ldquomultiple centers of power&rdquo emerged. The Provisional Government (Dawlat-e mowaqqat), controlled by Islamic and secular nationalists, was the least powerful of such centers. Ayatollah Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bāzargān leader of this government, but it was, as Bāzargān admitted, &ldquoa knife without a blade&rdquo (Bāzargān, 1982 Bakhash, p. 52). Competing with this government was the clandestine Council of Revolution (&Scaronurā-ye enqelāb), established by Ayatollah Khomeini before the shah&rsquos exile, which could veto governmental policies. The real center of power was the enigmatic Ayatollah Khomeini himself, Iran&rsquos charismatic strong man. He and his Islamist supporters, of both rightist and leftist persuasions, shrewdly established a mini-state that was beholden to Khomeini alone. The mini-state operated with impunity outside the jurisdiction of the official state and consisted of Khomeini&rsquos representatives in the government and in the newly established revolutionary institutions, such as the revolutionary tribunals (dādgāhhā-ye enqelāb), various revolutionary committees (komitahā-ye enqelāb), and the armed Revolutionary Guards (Sepāh-e pāsdārān-e enqelāb-e eslāmi Bāzargān, 1982, passim Ashraf, 1994, pp. 114-20, 129-42 Milani, 1988, pp. 147-51).
Behind these multiple centers of power within the new regime, three paradigms for Iran&rsquos future collided. In the first paradigm, which Bāzargān symbolized, Iran was to become a democratic presidential system, with the Shiʿite ʿolamāʾ playing a supervisory role in the affairs of state. In the second paradigm, advocated by leftist Islamists, Iran was to become an Islamic society, defined by social and economic justice. The leftist Islamists sought economic self-sufficiency, limits on agricultural landholding, nationalization of major industries, progressive labor and social welfare legislation and they opposed rapprochement with the West, especially the United States. These followers of ʿAli &Scaronariʿati, the &ldquoideologue&rdquo of the Islamic revolution, supported Khomeini because of his charismatic authority and not his &ldquoincumbency of the office of the supreme guide &lsquowali-e faqih,&rsquo &ldquo (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 2001, pp. 240-41). In the third paradigm, which Ayatollah Khomeini championed, Iran was to become a puritanical Islamic theocracy, with the ʿolamāʾ as its rulers.
Khomeini and the coalition of his conservative and leftist followers methodically undermined Bāzargān. Having won the overwhelming majority of the seats in the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e ḵobragān) in June of 1979, they drafted a constitution which legitimized the doctrine of sovereignty of the leading Shiʿite jurisprudent as representative of the Hidden Imam (welāyat-e faqih see Ashraf, 1994, pp. 129-42, and Enayat, 1983, pp. 160-80). It was during the pivotal hostage crisis that the fate of this draft constitution was shaped and decided upon (see below).
Marxist-Leninist Fedāʾiān-e ḵalq and Sāzmān-e peykār and Islamic socialist Mojāhedin-e ḵalq,themain guerrilla organizations (see COMMUNISM iii.), as well as the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party, were very influential among the youth, especially in universities. Secular leftists persistently belittled Islamic groups as &ldquopetty bourgeoisie,&rdquo questioned their revolutionary credentials, and accused them of being &ldquosoft&rdquo toward or even collaborating with &ldquoU.S. Imperialism.&rdquo In this radical era, the predominantly young leftist Islamists were determined not to be outmaneuvered and marginalized by secular leftists. They mobilized the masses and founded various groups, including the Office for Consolidation of Unity (lit., Bureau for Strengthening Unity: Daftar-e taḥkim-e waḥdat) in the summer of 1979, which planned and executed the takeover of the American Embassy in October of 1979. Located on the periphery of power, the leftists of all persuasions relentlessly criticized Bāzargān&rsquos reformism and pushed the revolution toward radicalism, which aided the followers of Khomeini to consolidate their position. They were the most prolific exponents of radical politics during an era when extremism was camouflaged as mainstream thought. They popularized &ldquoanti-U.S. imperialism&rdquo as the main ethos of the Revolution, and they persistently called for the suspension of military, economic, and political treaties with the U.S. and the expulsion of U.S. military advisors. The leftists also set a precedent for hostage-taking. On 14 February 1979, the Fedāʾiān-e ḵalq, who had found fame in the struggle against the shah, attacked the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking some of the staff hostage, including Ambassador William Sullivan. Ayatollah Khomeini refused to endorse this &ldquoValentine&rsquos Day attack&rdquo and Ayatollah Behe&scaronti and Ebrāhim Yazdi, members of the Council of Revolution and representing the government, resolved the conflict quickly and peacefully (Sick, 1985, p. 175 United States Congress, 1981a, p. 16). One month later, the U.S. Consulate in Tehran suffered minor damage from a rifle grenade attack. Shortly after these attacks, Ambassador Sullivan permanently left Iran and in June of 1979 Bruce Laingen arrived in Tehran as Chargé d&rsquoAffaires. Because of the attacks on the embassy, the U.S. accelerated staff reduction embassy staff was reduced from 1,400 in 1978, to 60 by mid-1979 (Christopher, 1985, p. 57).
In the first nine months of the revolution, Bāzargān sent conciliatory messages to the U.S. government. He hoped to develop friendly relations with the U.S. and thus consolidate his rule. He insisted only on terminating those U.S.-Iran treaties which he deemed detrimental to Iran&rsquos national interests. Cabinet member ʿAbbās Amir Enteẓām declared that Iran should not expel all U.S. military advisors in order to &ldquotake maximum advantage of its military investment,&rdquo and Ebrāhim Yazdi noted that Iran must receive spare parts from the U.S. to insure that its mostly American-made weapons systems &ldquowould not turn into useless and worthless metal&rdquo (Mardom, 7 August 1979 Sick, 1985, pp. 176 and 189 Amir Enteẓām, 2001a and 2001b). Bāzargān was even prepared to welcome a new American ambassador, William Cutler but Ayatollah Khomeini pressured him to inform Washington to withdraw the nomination after the U.S. Senate passed the &ldquoJavits resolution,&rdquo which strongly condemned summary executions in Iran (Bill, pp. 283-84). In most cases, the U.S. government did not support Bāzargān. It refused to deliver equipment previously purchased by the shah, and cancelled arms deliveries to Iran, such as 160 F-16 fighters. In short, the U.S. opted for a &ldquowait-and-see&rdquo approach, hoping to normalize relations with the victor in Iran&rsquos continuing power struggle (Bill, pp. 264-67).
The conciliatory policy of the United States government toward the exiled shah weakened Bāzargān and precipitated the hostage crisis. After a short sojourn in Egypt by invitation of President Anwar Sadat, the shah went to Morocco, the Bahamas, and then to Mexico. Ironically, the man who was among the world&rsquos most powerful figures a year earlier was unable to find permanent asylum anywhere. Secretary Vance writes that, in December of 1978, when the shah was contemplating leaving Iran, Ambassador Sullivan informed him that &ldquohe would be welcome [in] the United States&rdquo (Vance, p. 370). During the first few months of exile, the shah rejected this offer to show his &ldquodispleasure with the United States&rdquo (Vance, p. 370). President Carter recalls that &ldquowe had left open our invitation for him [the shah] to come to the United States,&rdquo but adds that he later decided &ldquoit would be better for the Shah to live elsewhere&rdquo (Carter, p. 452).
Carter&rsquos decision to abandon an old ally intensified the rift within his administration it also angered the shah&rsquos friends in the United States. On one side, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski favored reversing the policy, suggesting that &ldquowe must show our strengths and loyalty to an old friend even if it means personal danger to a group of very vulnerable Americans&rdquo (Carter, p. 453 Brzezinski, pp. 472-73). On the other side, Secretary Vance asserted that, if the shah were admitted to the U.S. before a new, stable government was in place there, it could endanger Americans in Iran who &ldquomight be taken hostage&rdquo (Vance, p. 370).
In May of 1979, David Rockefeller informed Carter that the shah was terminally ill with malignant lymphoma, which prompted Carter&rsquos re-evaluation of U.S. policy toward the exiled king (Carter, p. 454). Henry Kissinger also pressured the administration, linking his willingness to &ldquosupport us on SALT to a more forthcoming attitude on our part regarding the Shah&rdquo (Brzezinski, p. 474). Many others cautioned the President not to reverse his policy, however. Chargé Laingen, who was in close contact with the Bāzargān government, warned Washington of potential U.S. Embassy seizure and hostage-taking by irate Iranians (United States Congress, 1981d, p. 230 Laingen, p. 9 and Carter, pp. 453 and 455). These contradictory recommendations resulted in Carter&rsquos confusion, forcing him to ask top advisors, &ldquoWhat are you guys going to advise me to do if they overrun our embassy and take our people hostage?&rdquo (Jordan, p. 5).
Ultimately, Carter decided to permit the shah to enter the U.S. for medical and humanitarian reasons. After this reversal of policy, the division within his administration intensified. Vance recommended that Bāzargān should be informed of the new policy if Bāzargān vehemently opposed the decision, another assessment of the policy should begin. Brzezinski maintained that Bāzargān must &ldquohave no voice in the decision,&rdquo and should simply be informed of the decision afterwards (Carter, pp. 455-56, and Brzezinski, p. 475). Brzezinski prevailed, and Laingen simply informed Bāzargān of the new policy. To convince Khomeini that the shah&rsquos entry to the U.S. was solely for medical reasons, Bāzargān requested that Iranian doctors examine the shah Carter, however, rejected this proposal (Carter, p. 455). Although he was unhappy with the U.S. decision, Bāzargān nevertheless &ldquopledged to help if the embassy was attacked&rdquo (Laingen, p. 10).
On 22 October 1979, the shah arrived unannounced in New York City for medical treatment at the Cornell Medical Center. The revolutionaries did not accept the veracity of the claim that the shah was admitted for medical reasons, partly because the shah&rsquos leukemia had been a &ldquostate secret&rdquo during his reign (Sick, 1985, pp. 181-84). Instead, the shah&rsquos admission renewed bitter memories of the CIA-led 1953 coup d&rsquoétat, in which the nationalist government of Moḥammad Moṣaddeq was overthrown and the shah&rsquos rule reinstated (Cottam, 1988). Many believed the U.S. was orchestrating a similar plan to restore the Pahlavi dynasty. Consequently, areas outside the U.S. Embassy in Tehran became a &ldquoMecca&rdquo for leftists, who organized rancorous demonstrations against the U.S., demanding the extradition of the &ldquocriminal shah&rdquo to Iran (see Mirdāmādi, &ldquoČerā sefārat e&scaronḡāl &scaronod?&rdquo [Why was the embassy occupied?], in Sotudeh and Kāviāni, pp. 67-70 Ebtekar, pp. 44-45).
The Islamist followers of Khomeini displayed an even greater anti-American posture than secular leftists. Their political vernacular was becoming characteristically vitriolic toward the U.S., as they organized crowded and rancorous demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy. Ayatollah Khomeini called on the masses to &ldquoforce&rdquo the U.S. to return the &ldquocriminal shah&rdquo to Iran (for the text, see Sotudeh and Kāviāni, pp. 82-83). The Office for Consolidation of Unity, then an obscure and small Islamic organization, took this rhetoric to an extreme. After pictures appeared in Iranian newspapers of Bāzargān and his foreign minister Yazdi shaking hands with U.S. National Security Advisor Brzezinski in Algeria on 1 November 1979, half a dozen of the top leaders of the Office for Consolidation of Unity met secretly to plan the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran. Moṣṭafā Čamrān, a close confidant of Khomeini also met Brzezinski (Brzezinski, p. 475). The fateful meeting was called at the suggestion of Ebrāhim Asḡarzādeh, an engineering student at the &Scaronarif University of Technology. His call was supported by Moḥsen Mirdāmādi, an engineering student from the Polytechnic University, and Ḥabib Biṭaraf, an engineering student from the University of Tehran. Those who attended formed a Coordinating Committee, which included two other students: Reżā Sayf-Allāhi, from the &Scaronarif University, and Raḥim Bāṭeni, from the National University (later called Behe&scaronti University). The committee contacted Ḥojjat-al-Eslām Moḥammad Ḵoʾinihā, a radical cleric who was Khomeini&rsquos confidant and his representative in the National Iranian Radio and Television. They discussed their plan to attack the American Embassy and asked him to seek Khomeini&rsquos advance approval. Ḵoʾinihā supported the plan and joined the students as their spiritual guide (Ebtekar, Chapter 1 Macleod, pp. 58-59 and interview with Ḵoʾinihā in Majalla-ye ḥożur 2, Ābān 1370 &Scaron./November 1991, p. 2). The plan was kept hidden from the government as well as from secular leftists. According to Asḡarzādeh, the Coordinating Committee was particularly fearful that, if the plan was leaked, well-organized guerrilla organizations could seize the embassy before they could (Sotudeh and Kāviāni, pp. 90-92).
In an interview with this author, Ḵoʾinihā stated that the militants felt that the Bāzargān government was getting dangerously close to the U.S. and was moving the Revolution in a misguided direction. They believed the shah&rsquos admission to the U.S. was part of a conspiracy by the U.S. to &ldquodestroy the Islamic Revolution&rdquo and remake Iran into a &ldquoU.S. puppet.&rdquo They wanted to attack the embassy for its symbolic significance, which &ldquowould have world-wide repercussions and would allow them [students] to express their outrage against the U.S. and the shah&rsquos admission&rdquo (Milani, 1985, p. 165). Their original intention, Ḵoʾinihā insisted, was to only occupy the embassy temporarily, a claim Laingen finds plausible (United States Congress, 1981d, p. 232). None of the students expected the occupation to become an enduring crisis. Whether Ayatollah Khomeini had advance knowledge of the takeover plan is difficult to establish, although Ḵoʾinihā stated that the Ayatollah was deliberately kept in the dark, which Laingen confirms (United States Con-gress, 1981d, p. 234). After the takeover, Ḵoʾinihā claimed that all the leading clerics he contacted expressed approval, except Ayatollah Mahdawi-Kani, who was a leading conservative, the head of the Revolutionary Committees, and a major figure within Khomeini&rsquos circle of advisors. The Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Kāẓem &Scaronariʿatmadāri, who was not contacted by Ḵoʾinihā, however, refused to condone the takeover.
The seizure of the American Embassy. &ldquoSunday, November 4, 1979,&rdquo writes President Carter, &ldquois a date I will never forget&rdquo (Carter, p. 457). On that day, some 300 militant students stormed and occupied the U.S. Embassy. Calling themselves the Muslim Students Following the Line of Imam [Khomeini] (Dāne&scaronjuyān-e mosalmān-e payrov-e ḵaṭṭ-e emām), they took the personnel hostage and started a major international crisis. The Bāzargān government was unprepared and powerless to provide assistance when the Embassy was occupied. Absent from the embassy at the time were Chargé Laingen, Political Counselor Victor Tomseth, and Security Officer Mike Howland, who were conducting diplomatic business at the Iranian Foreign Ministry building. They were taken hostage as well but were not transferred to the embassy compound. Six Americans managed to escape the attack, finding sanctuary at the Canadian and Swedish embassies, and they eventually fled Iran on 29 January 1980, using false documents and Canadian passports (Pelletier, 1981 Sick, 1985, p. 189 for the list of those who fled Iran, see Table 1).
Ayatollah Khomeini remained silent during the first day of the crisis, gauging the country&rsquos mood. After Ḵoʾin-ihā informed him about the identity of the captors and after his son, Aḥmad, visited the occupied compound on the second day, the Ayatollah publicly blessed the takeover. He proclaimed the hostage crisis to be a &ldquowar between Islam and blasphemy,&rdquo and stated that the &ldquoGreat Satan was too impotent&rdquo to harm Iran. These comments fueled the militants&rsquo belligerence, elevating them as a new voice in the cacophony struggling to shape Iran&rsquos future (see Bāqi, pp. 31-32 Sotudeh and Kāviāni, pp. 102-3, 111-13).
Ḵoʾinihā, Aṣḡarzādeh, Mirdāmādi, and ʿAbbās ʿAbdi, an engineering student from the Polytechnic University, formed the leadership of the captors. The militants organized six specialized committees to administer the daily affairs of the occupied compound: &ldquoThe Operations Committee handled security within the compound the Documents Committee was responsible for the translation, exposure and publication of the seized and reconstituted documents the Public Relations Committee arranged media interviews, contacts with the public and meetings with officials the Services Committee provided food and other basic necessities the Information Committee was in charge of intelligence and security and finally, the Hostage Affairs Committee dealt with everything related to our charges&rdquo (Ebtekar, p. 198). Students from the main universities were also provided with offices in the compound to hold regular meetings.
Some secular leftist organizations, such as the Tudeh, hailed the embassy attack as a major victory over &ldquoU.S. Imperialism,&rdquo but other groups were less enthusiastic. Khomeini, however, pressured one of these groups to voice their approval, stating that &ldquoI have not heard any word of support from the Fedāʾiān-e Ḵalq, who consider the U.S. as the number one enemy of our people, for these young men who have captured the American Embassy and found it as the center of conspiracies&rdquo (as cited in Bāqi, p. 36 see also idem, pp. 14-15, 35-36 ʿAbdi, passim Sotudeh and Kāviāni, pp. 52-57 Ebtekar, pp. 49, 59).
Bāzargān steadfastly condemned the takeover as a violation of international law and civilized diplomacy. He demanded the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages, denouncing the militants for placing Iran on a dangerous collision course with the U.S. The militants ignored his demands and instead accused him of collaboration with the U.S. Within two days of the crisis, Bāzar-gān submitted his resignation, attributing it to the interventions of the revolutionary institutions, which in the convoluted vernacular of the time was an unambiguous reference to Ayatollah Khomeini (Bāzargān, 1982, p. 290 Bāqi, pp. 33-35 Yazdi, passim Mirdāmādi, passim). Thus, the forces of moderation and nationalism suffered their first major defeat, and Iran took a giant step toward becoming an Islamic theocracy.
With the resignation of Bāzargān, Iran had virtually no visible government, but was run by the secret Council of Revolution and the revolutionary institutions. Henceforth, the struggle between opponents and proponents of establishing a theocracy became closely linked with the hostage crisis. Abu&rsquol-Ḥasan Bani Ṣadr became the acting Foreign Minister at that critical time. A close advisor to Ayatollah Khomeini when in Paris, the French-educated Bani Ṣadr shared more in common with Bāzargān&rsquos liberal ideology than with Khomeini&rsquos radical interpretation of Islam. Like Bāzargān, he was mistrusted by the militant students as a Western-oriented Islamic nationalist. Four centers of power had thus emerged, each with its own agenda and a changing list of demands for the release of the hostages: Ayatollah Khomeini, the Council of Revolution, Bani Ṣadr, and the militant students themselves. It was clear from the start that Khomeini called the shots and was the ultimate decision maker. For him, the passage of the draft constitution via a national referendum was more critical than resolving the crisis. He under-stood that the national fervor of the crisis could be directed toward his goal of institutionalizing the new republic. To this end, he ordered the Council of Revolution to arrange for a constitutional referendum, but would not specify when the fate of the hostages would be decided (Bakhash, pp. 71-75).
American reaction to the crisis. The hostage crisis created a serious dilemma for President Carter: How to free the hostages while protecting U.S. national interests and prestige? Initially, President Carter used peaceful, diplomatic options to free the hostages. Only once did he resort to violence, when he ordered a rescue military operation in May 1980. After the aborted mission, he once again relied on diplomacy. Military retaliation against Iran during the Cold War was not a prudent option, as it would have undoubtedly caused the strategically vital and oil-rich country to ally with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow had made it clear that any U.S. military action against Iran would not be tolerated.
Opting for a peaceful solution to the hostage crisis was a difficult choice for President Carter. There was a huge reservoir of public outrage toward Iran: Americans were horrified to hear about mock executions of some of the hostages and see blindfolded hostages paraded through the embassy compound, angry throngs chanting &ldquoDeath to America,&rdquo and the American flag desecrated. There were public calls for revenge and even &ldquonuking Iran,&rdquo as many Americans felt humiliated to see a superpower paralyzed, unable to free its hostages from a Third World country. Despite such public outrage, the popular Family Liaison Action Group, or FLAG, which represented the families of the hostages, opposed any action endangering the safety of the hostages.
The hostage crisis became an obsession with the mass media and altered the national mood of the United States (for details, see McFadden, pp. 227-36). Popular news anchor Walter Cronkite ended each daily news broadcast on the CBS network by stating the continuing number of days the hostages were in captivity. ABC&rsquos acclaimed program &ldquoNightline&rdquo was created to cover the hostage crisis.
There were numerous reports of discrimination and violence against Iranians living in the United States. Two Iranian students were found gagged and shot to death in San Diego, California. Although police said robbery was the apparent motive, many Iranians believed the killings were linked to the hostage crisis (The New York Times, 5 January 1980). An Iranian student at Boston University was also killed (The New York Times, 20 May 1979). An Iranian student killed a teenager in &ldquoself-defense&rdquo when his apartment was attacked (The New York Times, 17 December 1980). Two Saudi Arabians were attacked by assailants who mistook them for Iranians one of the men was hospitalized (The New York Times, 5 November 1980). Approximately 200 supporters of Khomeini were arrested and jailed in August of 1980 after demonstrating in Washington, D.C. During their ten days of imprisonment, the detainees claimed to have been harshly mistreated (The New York Times, 5 August 1980). A straight- &ldquoA&rdquo Iranian student at Atlantic City High School was barred from delivering the valedictorian address after 80 of the school&rsquos 140 teachers signed a petition objecting to her as the valedictorian (The New York Times, 6 June 1980). Some U.S. banks refused to honor Iranian students&rsquo checks (The New York Times, 18 December 1979). Sensing the prevalent distrust against them, many Iranians sought a defense by calling themselves Persians, which some Americans could not identify as Iran&rsquos traditional name.
In the first phase of the crisis, President Carter pursued a three-pronged strategy: (1) build an international consensus to isolate Iran, (2) negotiate with Iran, and (3) use the political and economic might of the U.S. to render hostage-taking too costly for Iran to keep the captives. Carter&rsquos diplomacy did have some results the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the Arab League, the Western European counties, dozens of prominent religious leaders, including the pope, Nobel Peace Prize winner Sean MacBride, and many heads of state of Islamic countries called for the release of the hostages (see Bāqi, pp. 41-55 Ebtekar, pp. 85-87).
President Carter utilized all possible channels of communication with Iran. His first covert attempt to contact Ayatollah Khomeini failed after it was leaked to the U.S. media. In that attempt, Carter had asked former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, known for his sympathetic views on the Iranian Revolution, and William Miller, a former U.S. Senate staffer who spoke Persian, to deliver a hand-written letter to &ldquoDear Ayatollah Khomeini.&rdquo The letter offered the release of the hostages in exchange for friendly bilateral relations. Khomeini declined to meet Carter&rsquos envoys and banned the Iranian authorities from contacting them (Eṭṭelāʿāt 17 Ābān 1358 &Scaron./8 November 1979 see also Ebtekar, p. 119).
Iran&rsquos refusal to release the hostages forced President Carter to use economic pressure. The first major move was the announcement on 12 November 1979, that the U.S. would no longer purchase Iranian oil. On 14 November, President Carter signed an executive order freezing all assets, properties, and bank accounts of the Iranian government in the U.S. He also ordered all Iranian students in the U.S., estimated between 45,000 to 50,000, to register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Those in violation of their visa terms were to be deported (Carter, p. 460).
The first break in the conflict occurred when Ayatollah Khomeini released thirteen female and African-American hostages on 18 and 19 November 1979 (see Table 2). Khomeini neither confirmed nor denied the assertion by the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) that it had influenced the decision to release those hostages. By that time, there were 52 Americans still in captivity (see Table 4, and Ebtekar, pp. 90-95).
Negotiations for the release of the hostages. The Iranian regime exploited the crisis to divert national attention from the debate over the draft constitution. The militant students had painstakingly pieced together shredded documents from the embassy, which they labeled the &ldquoSpy Nest,&rdquo or the headquarters of the CIA in the Middle East. Systematically organized into sixty-six volumes, called the &ldquoDocuments of the Spy Nest&rdquo (Asnād-e lāna-ye jāsusi), the documents covered a variety of issues, from the Israeli MOSSAD to the profiles of Iranian intellectuals and politicians. While the released documents were authentic, the militants did not publish all of them, particularly those that showed the contacts between some clerics and U.S. officials in Iran. With Ḵoʾinihā in control of the television network, the militants selectively released these documents at sensitive intervals to discredit any opponent as a U.S. spy or collaborator (see Ebtekar, Chapter IV). As a result, some people were imprisoned or exiled, and many other activists became demoralized and passive. ʿAbbās Amir Enteẓām, originally assigned by the Bāzargān government as a liaison with the U.S. Embassy, was the first victim of this smear campaign. He was imprisoned and remains the longest-serving political prisoner of the Islamic Republic (Amir Enteẓām, 2002a and 2002b).
While many Iranians were distracted, effectively becoming the collective hostages of the militant students, the regime held the referendum on the constitution on 2 and 3 December 1979. The militant students continued to accuse those who opposed the referendum proposal of betraying the Revolution and collaborating with the U.S. Despite opposition by secular leftists, nationalists, and even some leading clerics, the referendum proposal was overwhelmingly approved. It constitutionally transformed Iran into a Shiʿite theocracy&mdashanother dividend of the hostage crisis (Milani, 1988, pp. 154-55).
The most serious challenge to the constitution came from the moderate Ayatollah &Scaronariʿatmadāri, who issued a fatwā, or religious decree, against it. The militants countered by claiming that the embassy documents proved he and the leaders of the party he supported, the nationalist Muslim People&rsquos Republican Party (Ḥezb-e jomhuri-e ḵalq-e mosalmān-e Irān), had received lavish support from the U.S. and from the shah&rsquos secret police (SAVAK). A popular uprising in Tabriz supporting the Grand Ayatollah was violently crushed by the followers of Khomeini, and the Muslim Republican Party was subsequently dissolved. Eventually, Ayatollah &Scaronariʿatmadāri was placed under house arrest, was implicated in an abortive coup, and died in seclusion (Bakhash, p. 67 and Rouhani, 1985).
With the new constitution firmly in place and the hostages still in captivity the campaign for Iran&rsquos first presidential election began. Convinced that he could not secure the quick release of the hostages, Bani Ṣadr instead focused on his campaign for the presidency. On 28 November 1979, Ṣādeq Qoṭbzādeh, another close advisor to Ayatollah Khomeini, replaced Bani Ṣadr as Foreign Minister. An Islamic nationalist, Qoṭbzādeh became more engaged in the hostage crisis than his predecessor, but he also failed to resolve the crisis. He, too, was mistrusted by the militant students who were becoming ever more aggressive. The militant students obstinately demanded the return of the shah and his &ldquobillions of stolen money.&rdquo They even threatened to kill the hostages if the U.S. attacked Iran or attempted a rescue. They talked about placing the hostages on trial for espionage, and demanded a U.S. apology for crimes against the Iranian people. The Carter Administration responded in November 1979 that, although the U.S. preferred a peaceful resolution, it would not hesitate to interrupt Iranian commerce if the hostages were placed on trial or even to retaliate militarily if they were harmed (Christopher, pp. 89-90). The militants took the veiled threat seriously.
The Carter Administration relied on multilateralism and particularly on the United Nations to resolve the crisis. On 4 December 1979, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 457, demanding the immediate release of the hostages and calling upon Iran and the U.S. to resolve their differences peacefully. Iran defied the resolution, however, and refused to release the hostages this caused the Carter Administration to threaten to support U.N.-sponsored economic sanctions against Iran. At the urging of the Security Council, and in an effort to avoid sanctions, Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary General, visited Iran on the last day of the year 1979, even though Khomeini and the militants had announced that they would not meet with him. Waldheim had extensive discussions with Qoṭbzādeh, Bani Ṣadr, and some members of the Council of Revolution concerning a U.N. commission to hear Iran&rsquos grievances against the shah and the U.S. Both Qoṭbzādeh and Bani Ṣadr believed that the formation of such a commission could lead to the release of the hostages. The U.S. expressed a willingness to discuss the formation of such a commission, provided that the hostages were freed first. When Waldheim failed to reach an agreement with Iran, the U.S. took its sanctions resolution to the Security Council. On 13 January 1980, the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution, which Iran hailed as another victory over the U.S. (United States Congress, 1981a, p. 84).
The first presidential elections in Iran were completed on 25 January 1980. Bani Ṣadr was voted into office, and he quickly warned the militant students not to disobey the &ldquopopularly elected president.&rdquo He soon found himself as powerless with the militant students as Bāzargān had been. In February of 1980, Khomeini emphatically stated that the yet-to-be formed Majles or parliament should resolve the crisis. Parliamentary elections were thus scheduled for May of 1980. It was clear that Ayatollah Khomeini was planning to prolong the crisis until another major institution of the new republic, namely the Majles, was put in operation (United States Congress, 1981a, p. 11).
At the same time, a secret plan to resolve the hostage crisis was being mediated by two Paris-based lawyers, Christian Bourguet and Hector Vallalon. The pair, who were in close contact with Qoṭbzādeh, Bani Ṣadr, and the Revolutionary Council, contacted the Panamanian government about extraditing the shah to Iran. At that time the shah had left the U.S. and was living in Panama. After the Panamanian government informed the Carter Administration about the sensitive issue of the shah&rsquos extradition, the two lawyers met with U.S. officials in Europe. They crafted a scenario in which a U.N. commission would meet with the hostages and relay their deteriorating health conditions to the Revolutionary Council the Council would then recommend that the hostages be moved to a hospital under its supervision. The real goal was to deprive the militant students of the custody of the hostages. Afterwards, the U.N. commission would produce a document about Iran&rsquos grievances to the U.N., which would then lead to the pardoning of the hostages. It is not clear if Ayatollah Khomeini knew about these secret negotiations (Sick, pp. 244, 274, 308 Bāqi, pp. 53-54).
As the first step of this scenario, Waldheim established a U.N. Commission of five prominent figures from Venezuela, Algeria, Syria, Sri Lanka, and France. The Commission was to hear Iran&rsquos grievances, although its members were reportedly unaware of the secret deal made by the two lawyers and the U.S. The commission&rsquos members arrived in Tehran on 23 February 1980. They met with Bani Ṣadr, Qoṭbzadeh, and some members of the Revolutionary Council, and heard from political prisoners of the shah&rsquos regime and families of the &ldquomartyrs of the Islamic Revolution.&rdquo When they asked to meet the hostages, Ayatollah Khomeini responded that the commission would only be able to meet some of the hostages after its final report was publicized. The commission disagreed with the demand and left Tehran without results on 11 March 1980. There was another attempt to revive the scenario when Qoṭbzādeh and Bani Ṣadr convinced the Council of Revolution to transfer the hostages to its own custody. Once again, Ayatollah Khomeini intervened, reiterating that the hostages were to remain with the students and that the Majles alone could make the final decision about their fate (United States Congress, 1981a, p. 148). One major hurdle during this ordeal was that Ayatollah Khomeini and President Carter had fundamentally different time tables Khomeini sought to consolidate power in the Islamic Republic and was in no hurry to resolve the crisis, but Carter wished to free the hostages before his re-election was to be decided in November 1979.
Whether the U.S. government was to support the extradition of the shah from Panama remains unclear, but the Americans close to the negotiations deny it. What we know is that the shah learned of the secret negotiations from friends and quickly left Panama for Egypt on 23 March 1980. Afterwards, Bani Ṣadr angrily denounced the U.S. for undermining him and for not genuinely seeking to resolve the conflict. He also condemned the militant students for hampering the foreign policy of Iran (United States Congress, 1981a, p. 136).
American rescue mission. As diplomatic initiatives continued to fail, the U.S. finally resorted to military measures. This second phase of the hostage ordeal began when the U.S. officially broke off diplomatic relations with Iran on 7 April 1980, a move Secretary Vance opposed (Brzezinski, p. 491). Ayatollah Khomeini celebrated this as a &ldquogood omen.&rdquo Algeria and Switzerland agreed to represent the interests of Iran and the U.S., respectively. President Carter also imposed a unilateral economic embargo against Iran, excluding food and medicine, and prohibited financial transfers to Iran. The most drastic measure was the military operation. This general plan was approved by the president in a special National Security Council meeting on 11 April 1980. Brzezinski favored the rescue plans and also suggested that the rescue plan should be &ldquoaccompanied by a contingency plan for an almost simultaneous retaliatory strike to provide a broader context in the event that the rescue mission should fail&rdquo (Brzezinski, p. 492). The controversial decision was reached when Secretary Vance was on vacation in Florida. Upon his return, he was &ldquostunned and angry&rdquo (Vance, pp. 410-12). Before the operation began, Vance submitted his resignation to Carter, agreeing not to publicly announce his resignation until after the military operation (Vance, p. 411). After all, he had opposed &ldquothe use of any military force, including a blockade or mining, as long as the hostages were unharmed and in no imminent danger&rdquo (Vance, p. 408). Three days after submitting his resignation, the rescue attempt, dubbed &ldquoOperation Eagle Claw,&rdquo began. It appears that Carter&rsquos losses in two presidential primaries a month earlier contributed to his decision to use force.
Plans for a rescue had been originally initiated immediately following the takeover of the embassy (Brzezinski, p. 487). Important to the implementation of the rescue plan was information from an Iranian &ldquowho was thoroughly familiar with the compound, knew where every American hostage was located, how many and what kind of guards were at different times during the night, and the daily schedule of the hostages and their captors&rdquo (Carter, p. 509). Based on this vital intelligence, 8 helicopters were to fly from the aircraft carrier Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman to Ṭabas, about 280 miles southeast of Tehran. They would be joined by six C-130 Hercules transport aircraft carrying ninety rescue personnel. The helicopters were to take the rescuers to a secret location approximately 50 miles from Tehran. After a one-night stay, &ldquothe trucks our agents had purchased&rdquo would carry the rescue team into the city (Carter, p. 510). The rescue team would then simultaneously attack the foreign ministry building and embassy compound, freeing the hostages who were to be flown to Saudi Arabia (Carter, pp. 509-10). In the words of Colonel Charles A. Beckwith, leader of the operation, &ldquoit was our aim to kill all Iranian guards, we were not going in there to arrest them we were going to shoot them right between the eyes, and to do it with vigor&rdquo (as quoted in Ryan, p. 60).
The rescue mission was aborted, however, during the first phase of the operation after three helicopters malfunctioned. In the rush to depart, one helicopter collided with a transport plane, killing eight American soldiers (for the names of the killed, see Table 3 for details of the operation and the Iranian reaction, see Carter Beckwith Ryan Ebtekar, chapter IX and Bāqi, pp. 57-85). Sensitive documents, maps, and weapons were abandoned there in the desert (Sick offers a comprehensive analysis of the rescue mission in Christopher, ed., pp. 144-72). It is not clear why a commander of the Iranian air force ordered the detonation of an abandoned U.S. helicopter that supposedly contained sensitive information (Milani, 1984, p. 179). According to President Carter, there were some Iranians involved in the rescue mission. He wrote that he &ldquomet with 5 Iranians who had helped us with the mission. They were superb. I would not hesitate to put my own life into their hands&rdquo (Carter, p. 510).
The astonishing ease with which the U.S. had penetrated Iranian air space was embarrassing to the Islamic Republic. In Iran, different conspiratorial theories surfaced concerning the failed rescue attempt. One theory was that the mission was part of a conspiracy to topple the Islamic Republic. Another notion was that the real aim of the mission was to kidnap Khomeini and a few top leaders to barter for the release of the American hostages (for the role of conspiracy theories in Iranian politics, see Ashraf, 1997).
After the failed rescue attempt, Vance resigned in protest (Vance, pp. 407-13), and relations between Iran and the U.S. became even more tense. Testifying before the Congress, Chargé Laingen recalled that &ldquoI find it difficult to see from what I knew of the situation then how it [the rescue mission] could have succeeded in the sense of getting us all out securely and without injury&rdquo (Hearing, 1981, p. 239). Despite Brzezinsiki&rsquos insistence on another military operation, President Carter decided to rely solely on diplomacy and he appointed former Senator Edmund Muskie as the new Secretary of State.
After the failed rescue attempt, the militant students dispersed the hostages, insisting they would not be released until all their demands were met. However, one of the hostages, Richard Queen, was released for medical reasons on 11 July 1980. Meanwhile, the power struggle between Bani Ṣadr and the followers of Khomeini intensified, as did the suppression of all forms of political dissident. In May 1980, Iran&rsquos parliamentary elections were held, in which the followers of Khomeini won the majority of the seats of the first Majles. Ḥojjat-al-Eslām Hā&scaronemi-Rafsanjāni, a close confidant of Khomeini, was elected president of the Majles. He agreed to address the hostage issue after receiving a letter from 187 U.S. Congresspersons demanding the release of the hostages. The Majles also pressured Bani Ṣadr to accept Moḥammad ʿAli Rejāʾi as the new prime minister. Bani Ṣadr was at that point practically excluded from policy decisions about the hostages, as was Qoṭbzādeh. Ḥā&scaronemi-Rafsanjāni and Rejāʾi thus emerged as two new players in the hostage crisis.
In July of 1980, the Islamic Republic claimed to have neutralized a U.S.-sponsored coup attempt, known as the Nuža coup, which sought, among other things, to bomb the residence of Ayatollah Khomeini. Stopping this coup resulted in the arrest, imprisonment, and execution of hundreds of officers (Gasiorowski, pp. 645-66).
Two important events changed the calculus of the hostage crisis. Firstly, on 27 July 1980, Moḥammad-Reżā Shah Pahlavi died in Egypt. His death removed one of the major hurdles on the way to resolution of the hostage crisis. Secondly, on 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. The war solidified the power of the followers of Khomeini, while the nation rallied behind Khomeini. The regime blamed the U.S. for permitting Iraq to attack Iran, perhaps to avenge the hostage crisis. Bani Ṣadr noted, however, that Iran needed military equipment to wage this new war, which was a clear indication that Iran should quickly resolve the hostage crisis (Bani Ṣadr, 1991, pp. 73-91).
The final stage of crisis. By the fall of 1980, the followers of Khomeini were well entrenched, controlling the Majles, the judiciary, the cabinet, and the revolutionary institutions. They were also in charge of the war effort against Iraq (Ashraf, 1994, pp. 129-42). At the same time, the ongoing hostage crisis was beginning to have more negative consequences than positive results, such as Iran&rsquos isolation, war with Iraq, and the continuing economic sanctions. Iran&rsquos willingness to negotiate at this point was the segue to the final phase of the hostage crisis.
Although U.S. private banks and some Iranian officials had held their own secret discussions as early as May 1980, it was only in early September, before the start of the war with Iraq, that the German ambassador to the U.S. informed the Carter Administration that Iran was prepared to settle the crisis. The ambassador was approached by a close relative of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣādeq Ṭabāṭabāʾi. On September 12th, 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini declared four conditions for the resolution of the crisis: (1) the return of the shah&rsquos wealth to Iran (2) cancellation of all financial claims against Iran (3) a pledge of military and political non-interference in Iran and (4) the release of Iranian assets. The announcement broke the deadlock. Three days later, Warren Christopher, former Deputy Secretary of State, secretly met with Ṣādeq Ṭabāṭabāʾi. At Ṭabāṭabāʾi&rsquos request, the German Foreign Minister also attended the meeting. This was the start of the final negotiations for the release of the hostages. Algeria was the main intermediary in these secret negotiations (Christopher, pp. 297-324).
The Majles approved the four conditions set by Khomeini on November 2, but in greater detail, appointing seven deputies with Behzād Nabavi, a leading radical, as the chief negotiator to manage the secret negotiations. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie agreed in principle with the four conditions. The resulting negotiations produced the Algiers Agreement, which led to the release of the hostages (Ebtekar, Chapter X United States Congress, 1981d,pp. 263-85).
According to the Algiers Agreement, or what the militant students called a bayāniya or declaration, &ldquothe United States pledges that it is and from now will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran&rsquos internal affairs&rdquo (United States Congress, 1981d, p. 263). The U.S. also agreed to disallow lawsuits by hostages or family members against their captors or against the Iranian government, and to cooperate with the Islamic Republic&rsquos legal battles in the U.S. courts to obtain the Pahlavi family&rsquos wealth. Additionally, the U.S. agreed to release the frozen Iranian financial assets. Approximately $7.98 billion were transferred to Iran&rsquos escrow account, &ldquoDollar Account 1,&rdquo at the Bank of England, of which about $3.67 billion was transferred to the New York Federal reserve to cover Iran&rsquos debts to U.S. banks (United States Congress, 1981d, p. 140). The agreement established an international tribunal for the judgement of commercial claims of U.S. citizens against Iran this tribunal was backed with $1.4 billion from Iranian assets. The Iranian government therefore received only $2.88 billion (United States Congress, 1981c Bāqi, pp. 99-109).
Two days before the inauguration of President-Elect Ronald Reagan, the Majles officially approved the Algiers Agreement. On 20 January after the Bank of England confirmed the transfer of funds, the hostages were taken by bus to the Mehrābād Airport in Tehran. Less than one hour after the Reagan&rsquos inauguration, three Algerian aircraft took to the skies, taking all hostages to freedom. None of the hostages was killed, but many were emotionally and psychologically harmed during their 444 days of captivity (for the list of hostages freed on 20 January 1981, see Table 4). After their return to freedom, some of the hostages retired, some changed careers, and some of them published books about their captivity.
The Algiers Agreement provided President Bani Ṣadr and former Premier Bāzargān with ammunition against Premier Rejāʾi, Nabavi, and the leftist Islamists. They emphasized that Americans made no official apology, the hostages were not tried, the shah&rsquos wealth was not returned, and that Iran had lost access to its assets in the U.S. for over a year. The hostage crisis, they argued, made Iran a pariah state and vulnerable to Iraqi invasion. They also complained that Iran did not obtain a U.S. commitment to provide the necessary military equipment for Iran&rsquos war effort. (Bani Ṣadr, 1983, pp. 143-75 also the list of articles in Enqelāb-e eslāmi, Bani Ṣadr&rsquos daily newspaper, and in Mizān, the daily organ of Bāzargān&rsquos Nahżat-e āzādi, as presented in Bāqi, pp. 443-54 see also a commentary on this issue in Bāqi, pp. 111-41 for Rejāʾi&rsquos response, see Rejāʾi, pp. 24-33).
The regime tried to sell the agreement as a major victory over the &ldquoGreat Satan.&rdquo Speaker Rafsanjāni declared the hostage crisis to have proven that a Third World nation could challenge the world&rsquos mightiest military power. &ldquoWe demonstrated that the decision is with us. When we desired, we talked. When we desired, we remained silent we got everything we wanted&rdquo (Hā&scaronemi Rafsanjāni, 1983, p. 39). He added that U.S. sanctions forced Iran into self-reliance, developing its indigenous industries. Prime Minister Rejāʾi boasted that the hostage crisis &ldquoforced the greatest satanical power to its knees&rdquo (United States Congress, 1981a, p. 31).
The hostage crisis and the 1980 presidential election. The hostage crisis was also a contributing factor in the electoral defeat of incumbent Democratic President Jimmy Carter and the landslide victory of the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. The timing of the hostage release later fueled suspicions that representatives of the Reagan/Bush campaign may have covertly struck a deal with the Iranians this was dubbed the &ldquoOctober Surprise.&rdquo According to this theory, the Iranians pledged not to release the hostages before the presidential election, in exchange for a promise by the U.S. to provide Iran with weaponry (Sick, 1991). Investigations by the Congress, however, have not produced any proof for the allegation (United States Congress, 1992a, 1992b, 1993).
The exertion of influence over the 1980 U.S. presidential election was a contentious issue among Iran&rsquos governing elite. Foreign Minister Qoṭbzādeh, President Bani Ṣadr, and Ayatollah Ḥosayn-ʿAli Montaẓeri, among others, favored the early release of the hostages to help Democratic incumbent President Carter. Qoṭbzādeh believed that &ldquowe have information that the American Republican Party, in order to win the upcoming election, is trying very hard to delay the resolution of the hostage question until after the American election&rdquo (Sick, p. 89). Montaẓeri was apparently influenced by his radical son, Shaikh Moḥammad, who was in close contact with the Libyan President Muammar Ghadhafi, who preferred Democrats to Republicans (Montaẓeri, p. 257, and Bāqi, p. 48). Montaẓeri tried in vain to convince Khomeini to release the hostages before the U.S. presidential election in 1980, telling him that the victory of the Revolution owed a great deal to Carter&rsquos human rights policy and that Democrats were preferable to Republicans (Montaẓeri, pp. 257-58). Both the militant students and Khomeini saw no qualitative differences between the two American political parties. They seem to have developed a vendetta against Carter for freezing Iranian assets in the U.S. and for his ill-fated rescue operation. In their view, helping to defeat Carter would demonstrate Iran&rsquos leverage on American politics (Ebtekar, p. 230). There were also widespread rumors in Iran that Khomeini&rsquos Islamist followers were deliberately delaying the release of the hostages to prevent President Carter from being re-elected. Denying such rumors, Deputy Moḥammad Ḵazāʾi pointed out that &ldquothe only reason for any delay in this matter is the regular process of Majles legislation&rdquo (Majles-e &scaronurā-ye eslāmi, Moḏākerāt, 11 Ābān 1359 &Scaron./2 November 1980, pp. 4-5).
Even after losing the election, President Carter tried indefatigably to free the hostages before leaving office. Behzād Nabavi, Iran&rsquos chief negotiator in Algiers, claims that President Carter sent him the following message through the Algerian foreign minister: &ldquoI would sign the required executive order to release Iran&rsquos frozen funds in the U.S. banks if the Iranian government promises to release American hostages before I leave the White House&rdquo (as cited in Bāqi, p. 103).
Iran in the aftermath of hostage crisis. As a result of the hostage crisis, the Islamic Republic emerged with an institutionalized infrastructure and with the followers of Khomeini in full control. The hostage crisis, which placed Iran and the U. S. on a dangerous collision course, was certainly a major contributing factor in Saddam Hossein&rsquos impudent decision to invade Iran in September 1980. For eight long years, the two Islamic countries were engaged in a devastatingly bloody war.
Bāzargān&rsquos vision of turning Iran into a democracy, shared by Bani Ṣadr, Qoṭbzādeh, and many others, was all but shattered. Instead, the followers of Khomeini used the hostage crisis to establish a Khomeini-style theocratic order. After forcing Bāzargān to resign, they focused on Bani Ṣadr. The militant students declared that &ldquowe are 100 percent, not 99 percent, sure that Bani Ṣadr was cooperating with the CIA.&rdquo They claimed &ldquoembassy documents prove that Bani Ṣadr had committed treason&rdquo (Ioannides, 1984, p. 66). In March 1980, Bani Ṣadr secretly fled to France and sought asylum. In November of 1980, Qoṭb-zādeh was arrested. In September of 1982, he was found guilty of plotting a coup, and was subsequently executed. Rejāʾi and Behe&scaronti were killed in bomb blasts. Rafsanjāni became one of the most powerful figures in the Islamic Republic, winning the presidency twice in 1989 and 1993.
During the hostage crisis, and for a time afterwards, Islamist followers of Khomeini suppressed secular and Islamic nationalists. Members of the secular National Front, inheritors of Moṣaddeq&rsquos legacy, and the Islamic-nationalist Nehżat-e āzādi (Liberation Movement), who collectively had dominated the provisional government, were banned from holding governmental offices and participating in elections.
The hostage crisis provided a golden opportunity for the regime to suppress and even liquidate the leftist organizations. Secular leftists and the Mojāhedin were devoured by the revolution they had so relentlessly supported. After Ayatollah Khomeini disqualified their leader from competing in the 1980 presidential election, the Mojāhedin declared war on the Islamic Republic and took responsibility for a number of terrorist operations that killed many top leaders of the regime and war is exactly what they got. Khomeini&rsquos security forces responded ferociously and mercilessly, arresting and killing many of the Mojā-hedin, forcing them underground or into exile, first to France and then to Iraq. The fate of secular leftists was not much happier than the Mojāhedin&rsquos. Marxist-Leninist and Maoist organizations were declared illegal, their headquarters were ransacked by the Ḥeẓbollāhis, and many of their leaders were killed or arrested. They, too, were forced underground. The Tudeh party, the most seasoned of the secular groups, developed a tenuous but transparently opportunistic relationship with the Islamic Republic, praising Khomeini as an anti-imperialistic, progressive leader. They, too, had underestimated Khomeini. Khomeini gave the Tudeh a bit of its own medicine. He exploited the Tudeh to divide, weaken, and eventually disarm other secular leftists. By 1983, when the Tudeh served no other useful purpose, the Islamic regime arrested and imprisoned its top leaders and declared the organization illegal. By that time, secular leftists were demoralized and divided, operating outside of Iran.
During the 1980s, with Khomeini&rsquos blessing, Islamist leftists, who were closely associated with the militant students, exercised a considerable degree of control over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. They also were influential in the powerful revolutionary institutions, the intelligence and security forces, and the broadcast and print media. When Ayatollah Khomeini died in June of 1989, there was a major power shift in Iran Ḵāmenaʾi replaced Khomeini, Hā&scaronemi-Rafsanjāni was elected president, pro-Rafsanjāni pragmatists and conservatives ascended to positions of prominence, and leftist Islamists were pushed to the periphery of power (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 2001, pp. 241-43, and Milani 2001, pp. 29-35). Thus removed from the corridors of power, Islamist leftists began to go through a remarkable ideological metamorphosis and gradually evolved to champion a relatively moderate and liberal interpretation of Islam. Many factors contributed to this transformation, including the failure of the regime to fulfill its egalitarian promises, erosion of the legitimacy of the ruling clerics, resistance of the youth and women to the repressive cultural and social policies of the regime, popularity of a liberal interpretation of Islam by Iranian religious intellectuals, and the worldwide decline in acceptability of revolutionary ideas in the post-Cold War era (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 2001, pp. 249-53). Wearing a new ideological robe, leftist Islamists, once the symbol of Iran&rsquos extremism and adventurism, became the main mobilizing constituency behind the momentous victory of President Sayyed Moḥammad Ḵātami in the 1997 election. They have become architects of the new reform movement, which seeks to make the Islamic Republic less harsh, more tolerant, and more transparent. Many of today&rsquos top reformists, such as ʿAbdi, Asḡarzādeh, Mir-dāmādi, and Ebtekār were yesterday&rsquos leading hostage-takers (Macleod, p. 58). Ironically, many of them support normalizing relations with the U.S., the country they once described as &ldquoIran&rsquos natural enemy.&rdquo ʿAbdi, for example, initiated a cordial meeting with Barry Rosen, a former hostage, in Paris in 1998 (Macleod, p. 59). He is now serving a prison term for publishing a public opinion poll that revealed the desire of a large majority of Iranians to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. The Office for Consolidation of Unity, too, has become one of the main advocates of democratic reforms and even threatened to boycott the 2004 parliamentary elections.
In the wise words of former hostage Barry Rosen, the hostage crisis was &ldquocloser to defeat for both sides&rdquo (as quoted by Bill, p. 301). The hostage crisis served as an effective tool for the Islamist followers of Khomeini to consolidate the Islamic Republic and create a new Islamic order. Iran as a county, however, suffered from the hostage crisis its international reputation, prestige, and national interests were gravely damaged, and it became entangled in a bloody war with Iraq. The magnitude of this damage will be determined by future historians.
1. Memoirs and analyses by militant students. Amir-Reżā Sotudeh and Ḥamid Kāviāni, with an introduction by ʿAbbās ʿAbdi, Boḥrān-e 444 ruza dar Tehrān, goftahā wa nāgoftahāyi az taṣarrof-e sefārat-e Āmrikā (The 444 days crisis in Tehran, told and untold stories on occupation of the American Embassy), Tehran, 2000.
Massoumeh Ebtekar as told to Fred A. Reed, Takeover in Tehran, the Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture, Vancouver, 2000.
(She served as translator and public relations officer for the captors.) An interview with Ḵoʾinihā, in Majalla-ye ḥożur 2, Ābān 1370 &Scaron./November 1991, p. 2.
Most informative are the 66 volumes of the embassy documents published by the captors: Dāne&scaronjuyān-e peyrow-e ḵaṭṭ-e emām, Asnād-e lāna-ye jāsusi (Documents of the den of spies), Tehran, 66 volumes, 1980-83.
Scott Macleod, &ldquoRadicals Reborn, Iran&rsquos Student Heroes Have Had a Rough and Surprising Passage,&rdquo in Time Magazine, 15 Novembr 1999, pp. 58-59.
Moḥsen Mirdāmādi&rsquos response to a recent interview of former Foreign Minister Ebrāhim Yazdi (for the text of Yazdi&rsquos interview see 3, below): &ldquoPāsoḵ-e Mirdāmādi be eẓhārāt-e Yazdi,&rdquo in Emrooz (an internet site), 16 Day 1382 &Scaron./6 January 2004. ʿAbbās ʿAbdi &ldquo13 Ābān be rewāyat-e ʿAbbās ʿAbdi&rdquo (4 November as narrated by Abbas Abdi), in Yās-e no, 13 Ābān 1382 &Scaron./4 November 2003.
Proceedings of Iran&rsquos Parliament (Majles-e &scaronurā-ye eslāmi) concerning the crisis were published by ʿEmād-al-Din Bāqi, a former radical student: Enqelāb wa tanāzoʿ-e baqāʾ, pažuhe&scaroni dar zaminahā wa payā-madhā-ye e&scaronqāl-e sefārat-e Āmrikā dar Tehrān (Revolution and survival, a survey of background and consequences of the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran), Tehran, 1997.
2. Iranian authorities on the hostage crisis. ʿAbbās Amir Enteẓām, Ānsu-ye ettehām 1, ḵāṭerāt-e ʿAbbās Amir Enteẓām, az &Scaronahrivar-e 57 tā Ḵordād-e 60, Tehran, 2002a.
Idem, Ānsu-ye ettehām 2, moḥākema wa defāʿiyāt-e ʿAbbās Amir Enteẓām dar dādgāh-e enqelāb, Esfand-e 59 tā Ḵordād-e 60, Tehran, 2002b.
Abu&rsquol-Ḥasan Bani Ṣadr, Ḵiānat be omid (Betrayal of hope), Paris, 1983.
Idem, My Turn to Speak. Iran, the Revolution and Secret Deals with the U.S., Washington, D.C., 1991.
Mehdi Bāzargān, Mo&scaronkelāt wa masāʾel-e avvalin sāl-e enqelāb (The difficulties and problems of the first year of the revolution), Tehran, 1982.
Idem, Enqelāb-e Irān dar do ḥarekat (The Iranian revolution in two moves), Tehran, 1984.
ʿAli-Akbar Hā&scaronemi Rafsanjāni, Noṭqhā-ye qabl az dastur-e Hojjat-al-Eslām Hā&scaronemi Rafsanjāni (Hojjat-al-Eslām Hā&scaronemi-Rafsanjāni&rsquos opening speeches in Parliamentary deliberations), Tehran, 1984.
Ruḥ-Allāh Ḵomeyni, Kalām-e emām. Enqelāb-e eslāmi (The Imam&rsquos word: the Islamic Revolution), Tehran, 1983.
Nur-al-Din Kiānuri, Enqelāb-e bozorq wa &scaronokuhmand-e mihan-e mā (The great and glorious revolution of our homeland), Tehran, 1980.
Majles-e &scaronurā-ye eslāmi, Moḏākerāt-e Majles-e &scaronurā-ye eslāmidarbāra-ye gerogānhā (Proceeding of the Parliament concerning the hostage issue), Tehran, 1981.
Ḥosayn-ʿAli Montaẓeri, Matn-e kāmel-e ḵāṭerāt-e Āyatollāh Ḥosayn-ʿAli Montaẓeri (Memoirs of Ayatollah Ḥosayn-ʿAli Montaẓeri), Vincennes, France, 2001.
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, New York, 1980.
Moḥmmad ʿAli Rejāʾi, &ldquoGozāre&scaron-e āqā-ye Rejāʾi naḵost wazir darbāra-ye ḥall-e masʾala-ye gerogānhā&rdquo (The report of the Prime Minister Rejāʾi concerning the settlement of the hostage issue), in Majles-e &scaronurā-ye eslāmi, Moḏākerāt . . . , 6 Bahman 1359/26 January 1981, pp. 24-33.
Ebrāhim Yazdi, &ldquo13 Ābān be rewāyat-e Ebrāhim Yazdi&rdquo (4 November as narrated by Ebrāhim Yazdi), Emrooz (website), 16 day 1382 &Scaron./6 January 2004.
Ḥamid Rowḥāni, &Scaronariʿatmadāri dar dādgāh-e tāriḵ (&Scaronariʿatmadāri judged by history) Tehran, 1985.
3. Memoirs and works by the hostages and the rescue mission officers. Charlie Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force, New York, 1983.
William J. Daugherty, In the Shadow of the Ayatollah: A CIA Host in Iran, Annapolis, 2001.
Moorhead Kennedy, The Ayatollah in the Cathedral, New York, 1986.
Kathryn Koob, Guest of the Revolution, Nashville, 1982.
James Kyle, The Guts to Try, the Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander, New York, 1990.
Bruce Laingen, Yellow Ribbon: The Secret Journal of Bruce Laingen, New York, 1992.
John Limbert, &ldquoNest of Spies: Pack of Lies,&rdquo Washington Quarterly, spring 1982, pp. 75-82.
Alex Paen, Love From America, Santa Monica, Calif., 1989.
Jean and Claude Adams Pelletier, The Canadian Caper,New York, 1981.
Barbara Rosen, The Hostage Crisis and One Family&rsquos Ordeal,Garden City, N.Y., 1982.
Barbara and Barry Rosen (with George Feifer), The Destined Hour, Garden City, N.Y., 1982.
Paul Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed, Stanford, 1985.
Charles Scott, Pieces of the Game, Atlanta, 1984.
Rocky Sickmann, Iranian Hostage: A Personal Diary of 444 Days in Captivity, Topeka, Kan., 1982.
4. U.S. authorities on the hostage crisis. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memories of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981, New York, 1983.
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, New York, 1983.
Warren Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran: the Conduct of a Crisis, New Haven, 1985.
Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency, New York, 1982.
William Sullivan, Mission to Iran, New York, 1981.
United States Congress, House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Iran Hostage Crisis: A Chronology of Daily Developments, Report Preparedby the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., March 1981a.
Idem, Iran&rsquos Seizure of the United States Embassy: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 17, 19, 25, and March 11, 1981, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981b.
Idem, 1st Session, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Iran: the Financial Aspects of the Hostage Settlement Agreement, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981c.
Idem, 1st Session, Iran&rsquos Seizure of the United States Embassy: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981d.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The &ldquoOctober Surprise,&rdquo Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran, Report of the Special Counsel to Senator Terry Sanford and Senator James M. Jefford, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992a.
Idem, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Whether the Senate Should Proceed to Investigate Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages in 1980, hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, first session, November 21 and 22, 1991, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992b.
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980 (&ldquoOctober Surprise Task Force&rdquo), no. 102-11, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.Cyrus Vance, Hard Choice: Critical Years in America&rsquos Foreign Policy New York, 1983.
5. Studies related to the hostage crisis. Ahmad Ashraf, &ldquoCharisma, Theocracy, and Men of Power in Postrevolutionary Iran,&rdquo in Myron Weiner and Ali Banuazizi, eds., The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Syracuse, 1994, pp. 101-51.
Idem, &ldquoThe Appeal of Conspiracy Theories to Persians,&rdquo Princeton Papers, winter 1997, pp. 57-88.
Idem and ʿAli Banuazizi, &ldquoIran&rsquos Tortuous Path Toward Islamic Liberalism,&rdquo in International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 15/2, winter 2001, pp. 237-56.
Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs. New York, 1984.
Bahman Baktiari, Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran, Gainsville, 1996.
James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: America and Iran, New Haven, 1988.
Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, Pittsburgh, 1979.
Hamid Enayat, &ldquoIran: Khumayni&rsquos Concept of the &lsquoGuardianship of the Jurisconsult&rsquo,&rdquo in Islam in the Political Process, ed. by James Piscatori, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 160-80.
Mark Gasiorowski, &ldquoThe Nuzhih Plot and Iranian Politics,&rdquo IJMES 34/4, November 2002, pp. 645-66.
David Patrick Houghton, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis, Cambridge and New York, 2001. Christos Ioannides, Amercia&rsquos Iran: Injury and Catharsis, New York, 1984.
Kudetā-ye Nuža (The Nuzeh coup) Tehran, 1982.
Robert D. McFadden, Joseph B. Treaster and Maurice Carroll, No Hiding Place, New York, 1981.
Mohsen Milani, The Making of Iran&rsquos Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Boulder, 1994.
Idem, &ldquoHarvest of Shame: Tudeh and the Barzagan Government,&rdquo Middle Eastern Studies 29/2, April 1993, pp. 307-20.
Idem, &ldquoReform and Resistance in the Islamic Republic of Iran,&rdquo in Iran at the Crossroads, ed. by John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani, New York, 2001, pp. 29-56.
Russell Leigh Moses, Freeing the Hostages: Re-examining U.S.-Iranian Negotiations and Soviet Policy, 1979-1981, Pittsburgh, 1996.
R. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: Patterns of Influence, New York, 1982.
Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations, New York, 1981.
William Shawcross, The Shah&rsquos Last Ride, New York, 1988.
Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America&rsquos Tragic Encounters with Iran, New York, 1985.
Idem, October Surprise, America&rsquos Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan, New York, 1991.
Sāzmān-e Mojāhedin-e Ḵalq-e Iran, Mājerāhā-ye po&scaront-e parda-ye geroqāngiri (Behind the scene events of the hostage-taking), Tehran, 1981.
On April 1, following overwhelming support in a national referendum, Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic republic. Elements within the clergy promptly moved to exclude their former left-wing, nationalist, and intellectual allies from any positions of power in the new regime, and a return to conservative social values was enforced. The Family Protection Act (1967 significantly amended in 1975), which provided further guarantees and rights to women in marriage, was declared void, and mosque-based revolutionary bands known as komītehs (Persian: “committees”) patrolled the streets enforcing Islamic codes of dress and behaviour and dispatching impromptu justice to perceived enemies of the revolution. Throughout most of 1979 the Revolutionary Guards—then an informal religious militia formed by Khomeini to forestall another CIA-backed coup as in the days of Mosaddegh—engaged in similar activity, aimed at intimidating and repressing political groups not under the control of the ruling Revolutionary Council and its sister Islamic Republican Party, both clerical organizations loyal to Khomeini. The violence and brutality often exceeded that which had taken place under the shah.
The militias and the clerics they supported made every effort to suppress Western cultural influence, and, facing persecution and violence, many of the Western-educated elite fled the country. This anti-Western sentiment eventually manifested itself in the November 1979 seizure of 66 hostages at the U.S. embassy by a group of Iranian protesters demanding the extradition of the shah, who at that time was undergoing medical treatment in the United States (see Iran hostage crisis). Through the embassy takeover, Khomeini’s supporters could claim to be as “anti-imperialist” as the political left. This ultimately gave them the ability to suppress most of the regime’s left-wing and moderate opponents.
The Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregān), overwhelmingly dominated by clergy, put a new constitution to referendum the following month, and it was overwhelmingly approved. The new constitution created a religious government based on Khomeini’s vision of velāyat-e faqīh (Persian: “governance of the jurist”) and gave sweeping powers to the rahbar, or leader the first rahbar was Khomeini himself. Moderates, such as provisional Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and the republic’s first president, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, who opposed holding the hostages, were steadily forced from power by conservatives within the government who questioned their revolutionary zeal.
The 52 Iran Hostages Felt Forgotten. Here’s What They Wish Would Happen Now.
After President Trump referred to the dozens of Americans taken hostage in 1979, survivors said they were still waiting for the full $4.4 million payment once promised.
David M. Roeder, a retired Air Force colonel, was at home last week in Pinehurst, N.C., when he first saw the news flash on his television: An American embassy was under attack by protesters in the Middle East.
“I said, ‘Uh-oh, here we go again,’” said Colonel Roeder, who was among more than 50 Americans who were taken hostage at the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979, in a crisis that ruptured relations and set off 40 years of intense hostilities between Washington and Tehran.
“There are fires. They are attacking the embassy,” said Colonel Roeder, now 80. “That’s déjà vu.”
The latest attack — on the embassy in Baghdad — came days before a United States drone strike killed a top Iranian commander, quickly escalating tensions in the region. President Trump later referred to the hostage crisis in a warning to Iran not to retaliate, saying in a tweet that the United States had pinpointed 52 Iranian sites as potential targets, to represent the 52 Americans held by Iran from 1979 to 1981.
The president’s threat thrust the hostages back into the spotlight, at a time when some say they feel that their ordeal has largely been forgotten by the American public. Of 53 hostages, which includes an additional diplomat who was released early, an estimated 18 have died. The remaining 35, who are of retirement age, have moved on as best they can. Still, their 444 days of captivity hang like a shadow in the background of their lives, returning in their dreams, when Iran surfaces in the news and in their decades-long fight for monetary compensation.
In interviews, several of the former hostages said they were both surprised to be remembered and also reluctant to be pulled into a fraught and potentially violent political battle.
“I’m somewhat miffed that this in some form or another is supposed to be in our honor,” said Al Golacinski, a former regional security officer at the embassy who is now 69 and retired in Ponte Vedra Beach, Fla. “I don’t need that.”
“We’ve all gone on with our lives, those of us that are still alive, and there are fewer and fewer of us every six months or so,” said Chuck Scott, an 88-year-old retired Army colonel who was commander of the special forces team at the time of the hostage crisis. He added, “We’re not part of it anymore.”
In an interview on MSNBC, another former hostage, John Limbert, put it bluntly: “Mr. President, if you’re listening, please don’t bother yourself on my account, because I want nothing to do with it.”
The Iran hostages — who dealt with physical and psychological torture, including instances of solitary confinement and mock execution — have also had to fight for restitution since they were released because of an agreement that barred them from seeking damages for their imprisonment. In 2015, Congress authorized payments of up to $4.4 million: $10,000 per day of captivity, as well as a lump-sum payment to spouses and children. But only a small portion of that money has been paid, the situation complicated after relatives of Sept. 11 victims applied for compensation from the same fund.
Instead of drawing them into the current conflict, some of the hostages said they wanted the attention to be on restitution they said they deserved. “Why don’t you just go ahead and pay us the money you promised us?” Colonel Scott said.
V. Thomas Lankford, a lawyer in Alexandria, Va., who represents many of the former Iranian hostages and their families, is still fighting for further payment. He cited years of anxiety attacks, trouble sleeping and threats of suicide among former hostages.
“There was one hostage that died in the last two years,” he said. “Every night, his wife would tell me, he would cry and whimper in his sleep and all of a sudden he would sit and bolt up right as if he were still in captivity.”
“There is another very prominent one who, every time Iran becomes involved in the news in a big sort of way, he will have to go back to receive institutional help,” Mr. Lankford said, adding, “They have, in all respects, continued to be victims.”
Iran hostage crisis
During the Iran hostage crisis (1979–81), a group of Iranian militants, after seizing 66 American citizens at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, held 52 of them hostage for more than a year.
The crisis took place during the chaotic aftermath of Iran’s Islamic revolution (1978–79) and its overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty. Anti-American sentiment in Iran—fueled in part by close ties between the United States and the unpopular Iranian leader Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—peaked after the shah was forced to flee Iran in early 1979. The shah entered the United States for medical treatment later that year. Although the initial public response in Iran to the news of the shah’s arrival in the United States was moderate, on November 4 the embassy was attacked by a mob of perhaps 3,000, some of whom were armed and who, after a short siege, took 63 American men and women hostage. (An additional three members of the U.S. diplomatic staff were actually seized at the Iranian Foreign Ministry.) Within the next few days, representatives of U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Tehran-based diplomats from other countries attempted but failed to free the hostages. An American delegation headed by former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark—who had long-standing relations with many Iranian officials—was refused admission to Iran.
The hostage-takers, who enjoyed the tacit support of the new Iranian regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, demanded the shah’s extradition to Iran, but President Carter refused that demand and froze billions of dollars of Iranian assets in the United States. U.S. diplomats soon obtained two United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran’s actions. On November 17 the Iranians released 13 hostages, all women or African Americans, on the grounds that they were unlikely to be spies, and another hostage, who had become gravely ill, was released in July 1980. Throughout the ordeal the Iranians used as negotiating leverage the threat of putting the hostages on trial for various crimes, including espionage.
In April 1980 an attempt by U.S. military forces to rescue the hostages failed. Eight U.S. service members were killed during the mission when one of the eight helicopters sent for the operation collided with a support aircraft. By May 1980 the United States had convinced its closest allies to institute an economic embargo against Iran. Renewed negotiations for the hostages’ return began after the shah died in July 1980, but the remaining 52 hostages were kept in captivity until January 20, 1981, when they were released minutes after the inauguration of the new U.S. president, Ronald W. Reagan. In addition to placing a roadblock in the path of U.S.-Iranian relations, the Iran hostage crisis was widely believed to have contributed to Carter’s defeat by Reagan in the 1980 presidential election.
The Universe mathematical-physics EARTH WAR
The astrophysics galactic LOCAL REGION (Planet EARTH) is a test site for many concepts. Thus we have atomic experiments at FermILAB, social engineering experiments with humans, atomic brains and symbolic bio-computer design, etc. And we have mathematical-physics theorists that extend our understanding of the Universe.
The Earth government is active in the math science wars to protect Nature. As such, many military tools are available to the Earth government. these tools are provided from the Sartre
multi-dimensional existential spaces.
These spaces,etc are in various formats..familiar to many college students as:
- multi-dimensional math/physics functions
All of these have practical application . under Earth military defense laws of Nature.
For example, we look at the modern version of FIELD Theory. properly labeled:
Einstein's data processing DATA FIELD Theory and its applications.
Thus we have computer science in many formats in NATURE.
Here we shall partially explain the math world NEWS announcements of the past several years.
message --> World Dairy Expo" . subset letters
a) Base 2 exponents used by IBM computer science
What could year 2012 suggest?
Base 2 exponent 012 = 4096 in the the table below.
Perhaps,,the CLUE is the word
Recognition with subset letters
Record of data has record length 4096.
What do computer programmers think?
Are they interested in how the world works?
Computer EARTH system 370 messages have been ignored by the computer industry and university computer science departments. WHY? They are coding the brain neurotransmitters into DATA FIELDS they are coding the eye/optical nerve James Joyce data streams of consciousness.
Oh, they use all kinds of brain computer tricks. Consequently, the Base 16 Hex murders of April 16,2007 using their VIRGIN un-tested bio-computer programs. Thus the 1st TEST gives the Virginia TECH shooting. The university computer science departments will not stop their CAD --> human CADAVER experiments because they are government funded CAD projects. Newspaper editors and reporters approve of this process, citizens will not protest the human CAD --> CADAVER tests.
This reminds us of the Base 2 math war ..
known as World WAR 2 with the math . axis powers.
the geometry axis used in an algebra class graph
powers/exponents of a math variable x,y,z
So, why to math departments LIE to their graduate students?
Why do high school history teachers LIE to their students?
Why does the federal government Department of Education provide funds to schools and universities that perpetuate the LIE . and insult people like me . that respect math and its role in life.
FermiLAB refuses to speak out, the Department of Energy doesn't allow the truth to be spoken.
c) y exponent suggests differential equations
d) y exponent suggests Fermat's Last Theorem
with Princeton and Andrew Wiles theory and the
astrophysics math life application specimen at CALTECH ..with the
Fe + y n + mantissa of Logan, Utah logarithms
Analysis of Earth math signals embedded in language.
Let's look at an example sentence.
- Jesus rose from the dead.
Keyword rose . got elevated to a higher level
- Rosemont Expo Center . subset keywords
Thus we consider the math translation .
Jesus rose from the dead to the AF .terlife -->
rose suggests base 2 raised to power 4 = base 16 hex.
What Nature's mathematical-physics message saying .
Base 2 living Jesus (stands on 2 legs) upon death .
his thoughts were transferred to another Earthly dimension .
this dimension being Base 16 HEX'AF' = 175 = AF TER.life.
Repeating . when Jesus was alive he symbolized number 2n.
Upon death ..the integer n rose into exponential position
Applied religious math . suggests choosing integer n = 4 . giving access to base 16 Hex.
We know . from some books and movies . that have a religious background
for example . religious heritage of base 16 hexadecimal
Curse - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The word "curse" may also refer to the resulting adversity for example, . of curses comprise a significant proportion of the study of both folk religion and folklore. . in terms of hexing (from the German word for witchcraft), and a common hex in .
Apparently the Asian world is caught in a death trap of Asian religions and will . was a Cabalistic magic symbol for white magic and the word hex comes from .
The truth be told, Hex signs are not representative of either Amish art or . signs such as that they derive from religious traditions of the Mennonites and Amish. . to make sense in light of the fact that the word "Hex" means "witch" in German.
A curse is real and such things really do work!www.professional-house-Such things can also be known as a hex or a jinx. . voodoo call what they do ' jinxes' whereas the Pennsylvania Dutch use the word 'hex' . In fact there is a special type of curse used to exclude people from a church or religious organization.
Thus university computer science/math department are really religious/theology departments.
I never knew that . and no teacher nor book mentioned it.
Now theory suggests the afterlife starts at Base 16 Hex 'AF' =175.
Take the physics professor
RicharD P. Feynamn . is there a copy of his symbolic mind?
DP = Data Processing base 16 HEX'Fe' =254 . thus suggesting that some subset entity of Feynman exists at level 254. Now Feynman was at CALTECH in Pasadena, California.
Alive . Feynman was a biological processor with brain symbolic data reocrds . thus his SKU11 contained within it. a physics/math information data set.
Now, Nature .. . thinking like Nature . would say to itself . upon Feynman biological death . it would be shame to lose that math/physics data set.
Thus it was arranged that he work at CALTECH, Pasadena . for 2 EARTH reasons:
a) In Computer Earth system 370 models of data space .
we have VSAM CA (like CALTECH) = Control Area.
b) given that Feynman was in
Pasadena, CA ..we look at the Computer EARTH OS/JCL ..
thus . in more accurate OS/JCL language .
Job Control Language - Wikipedia, the free
Job Control Language (JCL) is a scripting language used on IBM mainframe operating . In both DOS and OS JCL the first "card" must be the JOB card, which: . DISP=SHR tells the operating system that other programs can read OLDFILE at the . to process VSAM (Virtual storage access method) and non-VSAM data sets.
Preparing to use JCL samples in this collection -
IBM z/OS MVS™ JCL Guide (SA22-7598) and z/OS MVS JCL Reference (SA22-7597 ). The latter is an . //STEP1 EXEC PGM=CREATE //DD4 DD DSNAME= &&ISDATA(PRIME),DISP=(,PASS), // UNIT=(3350,2) . Virtual Sequential (VSAM) .
Thus . it makes sense . from Nature's systems . that the
Feynman brain data set of ideas (upon death) be passed to another mathematical-physics dimension in Base 16 Hex'Af' = AFTERLIFE.
This explains the CALTECH intellectual problems in social science, philosophy, and political science . in understanding simple concepts about daily life. Universities look at the world as a restaurant menu, if they like what they see ..then it exists if they don't like it . then that dimension of REALITY does not exist.
They are arrogantly myopic . narrow-minded . and have no interest in world gestalt.
Stanford and the University of California ..are modeled after Hollywood comedies. Thus the United States struggles in the INTELLECTUAL WARS as universities ignore the brain war ..that started in 1957 . with the Central Nervous System 370 battle. signaled by Central High School. Little Rock, Arkansas ..with 9 black students symbolic of 8 data bits and 1 error correction bit.
Universities in Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, etc. after 50 years . still can't comprehend that.
The universities ought be closed ..until they acquire some serious thinkers . instead of the song-and-dance and their football heroes . with the sports HEAD COACH appointed by the university . as the HEAD of all skull head math/physics thought activity. Hence, we have the thought control of science professors . via subliminal mind manipulation tricks.
Professors ..ought to check out this problem . but they are under the spouse control system.
BRAVE NEW WORLD . and their are zero brave thinkers in year 2012.
Introduction to M-theory - Wikipedia, the free
In non-technical terms, M-theory presents an idea about the basic substance of . This was later increased to 11 dimensions based on various interpretations of .
M-theory and 11 dimensions . a subtle SIGNAL to humans.
Mind theory. SKU 11 --> SKULL and brains war
Returing to math and computer science-->
with DP agent --> richarD P Hex'Fe' = feynman
and his subliminal mind CLUE about EARTH levels.
In Computer Earth system 370 models of data space .
we have VSAM CA (like CALTECH) = Control Area.
So perhaps, Earth space/time is partitioned into TWO or more control areas.
The obvious. would be the Earth surface area and it's living humans
. as 1 control area. such as Pasadena, California .
where intellectual people live in the Past verb tense .
with BIG BROTHER and Oceania propaganda.
Then the Base 16 Hex'AF' --> AFTERLIFE is another control area ranging
from level 175 to 254 . thus Feynman is up there! Is he?
But. what is up there. Possibilities?
a) the water molecules in the cloud level of about 10,000 feet .
b) The ionosphere and its radio reflection, etc properties
c) the Van Allen radiation belts . magnetic DATA field
Fe= Ferrous oxide atoms existed within the iron myoglobin proteins of the writing arm muscles of Feynman . when he wrote on the classroom blackboard or wrote a book. Thus the magnetic interaction with the North Pole and the magnetic shield seems to be the most probable.
Erwin Schrodinger with the cat in a box . dead or alive . is stating . in modern COMPUTER EARTH terms . that space/time is partitioned into 2 data sets.
Thus, today, the Schrodinger cat --> SYS1.CATALOG.
The magazine article supports a concept of the altered-ego.
Thus some math process is occuring in that Chicago region of Rosemont.
Was Jesus involved in a math message?
He died because he was doing cross-correlation statistical analysis in his . one of his states of mind . probably at a sub-conscious level. he was doing calculation for Nature's intellect OR the atomic /astrophysics continuum.
Another example of earth MATH life expressions.
Above we see the secret math map of the universities in Chicago area.
Thus the University of Chicago, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago Circle Campus, Roosevelt, DePaul, Loyola, Northwestern LUNT Building.
Notice the secret math exponent ROUTE codes.
Take math highway 41 . really base 4 ..which expresses the
living EARTH cell . and its math life of 4 DNA nucleotides.
42 --> Base 4 exponent 2 = Base 16 hex
43 --> Base 4 exponent 3 = 64 doubleword route
Thus route 41 and route 43 are orthogonal to route 64.
Notice the University of Chicago …..
secret COMPUTER EARTH … instruction code 41
of Highway 41 …….
Above we have Odeum Sports .
abbreviated OS. as in OS/JCL system 370.
Expo --> exponents in some format
DuPAGE ..near FermiLAB in Kane County
in computer term ..it suggests
DuPage --> Duplicate Page . as used in computer paging, etc.
data record sort/merge process of the EARTH computer
Jacob --> Job accounting Cobol computer job
BUSiness community expo . subset letters
New York HOSTS . subset letters
Isaac Newton and the Gravity Host computer system of the
G = Universal gravitational constant
Gravity interacts with atomic mass inside the human brain .
. giving the evolutionary rise to gravity thoughts.
Thus the Hollywood Grammy awards for humans and their secret relationship
Thus the EARTH GRAVITY government considers the human governments as subset governments.
Human governments pay universities, corporations, medical societies, physics societies to deny the existence of gravity and magnetic field interaction with the HUMAN . and the atomic mass of
the iron-56 atom of the HEME group Fe(ii) ion.
Universities and newspapers and magazines LIE to the Pentagon . printing incomplete and biased stories of REALITY. Editors, reporters, university personnel, journalism schools are so elite . so important . so special . that they could teach creative writing class English 101. The big con-game in the history of mankind . their greatest effort is to fool the soldiers and the generals . who at least try to do the right thing.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force are given false, misleading explanations of what's going on in the Carl JUNG collective unconscious war zone . and what incorrect perceptions are given by the
UN (the United Nations of UN-conscious people).
The Europeans are into their long-range brain neurotransmitter communications system . the JOKE known as the EURO . subset word of n.EURO.transmitter . and related to Nero of 64 AD.
Hence, modern Europe burns ..WORLD WAR 2 (version of NERO) and now we have the shootings at Utoeya and Liege . the BIG LIE explanation of the Belgium tragic event.
Thus we study the math dimensions of math and physics theorists.
One of their application demo sites: EARTH LAB. Thus we have EARTH LAB representation . such as the DARPA /Pentagon site known as the biochemistry human LAB at Fort LAB Hood in Texas.
Also, Fort Hood is known for the DARPA Fortran computer program that was executed . that is . the HUMAN bio-computer program JOB . the JOB was executed . with 13 dead Army soldiers. In the DARPA and Texas university experiment .
--> Fort Hood soldiers Ran to avoid the electron shell messages via bullet shells.
The Pentagon provides soldier guinea-pigs for sacrifice . for the amusement and pleasure of Washington,DC intellectuals and their spouses AND to provide tragic news events to entertain the television and newspaper audience.
It's the same MIND-SET . the same society structure that existed in ancient ROME with the
Colosseum (also spelled Coliseum). Nothing has changed. the same nonsense social psychology games.
The first recorded gladiatorial combat in Rome occurred when three pairs of gladiators . Enjoy a virtual day at the gladiatorial games by visiting the Colosseum in . honor to uphold” (The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the .
Ancient. A map of central Rome during the Roman Empire, with the Colosseum at the . . Dio Cassius recounts that over 9000 wild animals were killed during the inaugural games of the amphitheatre.
Another modern EARTH LAB signal.
The EARTH government VIA its subset government . known as the United States . has the Department of TRANCE Sport ta shun. correction
Department of Transportation
with Secret agent . correction ..
with Secretary LaHOOD --> Lab Hood
The mysteries of life on EARTH with all the secret and hidden languages.
Then we have the coma tricks broadcast on television and radio.
and the Cole Hall Entrance in DeKalb, Illinois .
were the wave mechanics shooting took place.
Math and physics have so many secrets.
Or . are they secrets of others.
or . secrets of Nature and space/time
. waiting to be discovered by math and physics.
The University of Wisconsin and other MIDWEST schools have no interest in such matters.
Madison, Wisconsin is known for its SMOKE SCREENs and songs-and-dances . because they like the role model offered them by the CIRCUS. Indeed, intellectual have succeeded in their clown performances.
Ringling Brothers Circus Headquarters Historic District - Baraboo
Home › Aug 12, 2008 – The Ringling Brothers Circus was founded in 1884 in Baraboo, WI. The circus wintered here for 34 years before it merged with the Barnum .
Show map of 550 Water Street, Baraboo, WI 53913
Circus World Museum - Wikipedia encyclopedia
Baraboo remained the circus's headquarters and wintering grounds until 1918, when the Ringling Brothers Circus combined with the Barnum and Bailey Circus, .